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It can be argued very strongly that the major motivation behind the criminal
organizations and, for that matter, most criminal activity is that of the "almighty
dollar". An analysis of the drug trade and its promise of quick wealth is a case in
point. Historically, Congress, along with the fifty states, in line with the cannons
of Western criminal law, have passed statutes proscribing the specific illegal
activity. The current crime situation, evidenced by the current war on drugs, shows
that this approach has not been terribly successful in deterring criminals and the rise
of sophisticated criminal organizations.
However, Congress, in acknowledging the situation, has, for the first time
(notwithstanding possibly the RICO statutes and application of the tax laws) passed
statutes which do not specifically proscribe the criminal's activity; i.e., narcotics
distribution, but criminalize financial transactions conducted by the criminal with
the proceeds he has derived from the illegal activity. In short, these statutes target
the criminal and his cronies "'Achilles heel"; i.e., the money earned from the illegal
activity. These new statutes basically criminalize any transaction in which the
criminal spends his illgotten gains in promoting his illegal activity, or which
amounts to an act consistent with tax evasion, or which involves falsification of his
tax return, or concealing or disguising the nature, location, or source of the illegal
income. In fact, one of the statutes does not even require him to conduct a transaction
for a bad purpose. If the criminal takes some of his illegal income and buys a car,
jewelry, stocks, or any other luxury item whose price is greater than $10,000, the
criminal has committed a felony. Under these new statutes he can be prosecuted for
substantial felonies, consisting of maximum penalties ranging from ten to twenty
years in prison per transaction. In addition, Federal government can use these new
laws to seize all the assets he has acquired with his illegal income. In promulgating
these new statutes, Congress went one step further and included within the ambit of
these statutes anyone who deals in any financial transaction with the criminal,
knowing the money involved in the transaction came from the criminal's illegal
activity.
"The author is a special agent with the IRS Criminal Investigation Division. This article does not represent
the position of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, the Treasury Department, or the Department of
Justice. This article represents solely the author's own interpretation of the money laundering statutes, and
in no way reflects any official position of the above-named agencies and departments of the United States
Government. The article was written in December, 1990.
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This article will analyze in depth the elements, application, and limitation of
these statutes. It is the author's intent that the reader, after digesting the following
pages, will come away with an understanding of the statutes and have an appreciation
that these laws, although not a panacea, can be a powerful new tool for the Federal
government in its war against crime.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NEW MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTES
Money laundering is the process whereby illegally obtained monies are
"washed" so as to give the appearance of legitimately obtained income. It can be
accomplished in a myriad of ways. The Money Laundering Controls Act of 1986
created offenses which heretofore never existed.1 Crimes which were previously
described as "money laundering" were violations of the currency transaction
reporting requirements. Previous laws criminalized schemes to circumvent the
currency transaction reporting requirements, which require cash transactions in
excess of $10,000 conducted with financial institutions or casinos, or the transpor-
tation of cash into or out of the United States to be reported to the Secretary of the
Treasury.2 The new offenses created by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
are entirely different from the currency transaction reporting requirements.3 They
cover a greater variety of transactions and are not limited to cash transactions as are
the CTR (currency transaction report) requirements. The new money laundering
statutes are aimed to hurt the criminal, with the greatest impact, by hitting the
criminal in his pocketbook.
Not only do the new offenses provide stiff penalties -- a maximum of ten to
twenty years imprisonment per violation along with substantial fines -- they contain
forfeiture provisions which enable the government to seize assets acquired through
proceeds derived from certain illegal activities.4 In addition to the statutes providing
'Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle H, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18
and 3207-21 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1990).
2 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 5312-13 (Law. Co-op. 1990). 31 C.F.R. 88 103.11 through 103.39 (1989). § 5313-24
creates the requirement, in conjunction with the corresponding regulations, that banks, casino's, or any
other individual or entity which qualifies as a "financial institution" as defined by § 5312 or the
transportation of currency in or out of this country must file a currency transaction report for cash
transactions of greater than $10,000. For an in depth analysis of the currency transaction reporting
requirements, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-26, and a discussion on structuring, see Structured Transactions in Money
Laundering: Dealing with Tax Evaders, Smurfs, and Other Enemies of the People 15 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 83
(1988) and Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring
Transaction 41 FLA. L. REv. 287 (1989).
3 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 5311-24 (Law. Cp-op 1990). Whereas 31 U.S.C.S. § 5313 and following sections requires
a CTR to be filed by financial institutions as defined by 31 U.S.C.S. § 5312 and corresponding regulations,
the violation of these currency transactions reporting laws is by itself a felony, it can also be part of a money
laundering charge, 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1990).
4 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)-(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990). These subsections provide that any one convicted
under this statute "shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property
involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) provides that a person may be fined under this Title setting a specific limit as to the fine.
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stiff penalties, fines, and forfeiture provisions for the criminal, the new money
laundering statutes also apply to persons who assist the criminal in continuing his
illegal activity by accepting money from criminal which that person knows to be
derived from an illegal activity, in exchange for goods or services.5 In short, these
offenses are intended to make the criminal's profits worthless by putting other
persons on notice that if they knowingly conduct transactions with the criminal by
accepting "dirty money" from him, they may be just as liable as the criminal himself.
In short, by these statutes, Congress wanted to create a Federal offense against the
laundering of illegal income which would authorize the government to forfeit assets
and profits of criminals and professional money launderers, to give Federal law en-
forcement greater tools to investigate organized crime which requires the use of
professional money launderers, and to promote stiffer penalties so as to deter the
number of persons willing to engage in money laundering.6
The overall intent of Congress in passing the Money Laundering Control Acts
of 1986 can clearly be shown by the following statement:
The subcommittee is aware that every person who does business with
a drug trafficker, or any other criminal does so at some substantial risk
if that person knows they are being paid with the proceeds of a crime and
then uses that money in a financial transactions. As argued by Mr.
Shaw, "I am concerned about a broker who might take a quarter million
dollars of cash down to Fort Lauderdale taking that as payment. I am
concerned about a realtor who is going to make a $50,000 to $100,000
commission on a deal by knowingly doing it. I am sick and tired of
watching people sit back and say, "I am not part of the problem, I am
not committing the crime, and therefore, my hands are clean even
though I know the money is dirty that I am handling. The only way we
will get at this problem is to let the whole community, the whole
18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (1990). These statutes provides for the civil and criminal forfeitures relating to but not
necessarily involving money laundering. Subsection 981(a)(1)(A) makes civilly forfeitable any real or
personal property that represents the gross receipts a person obtained, directly or indirectly as a result of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 1957 or which is traceable thereto. Subsection 981(a)(1)(B) provides that
the United States may civilly forfeit property in the United States which represents the proceeds of a
violation of a foreign drug law, and such violation would be a U.S. felony and such felony occurred within
the jurisdiction of the United States. Subsection 981 (a)(1)(C) makes forfeitable any coin or currency or
other monetary instrument described by the Secretary of the Treasury, or property traceable thereto,
involved in a transaction or an attempted transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C.S. § 5313(a) (currency
transaction reporting requirement) or § 5324 (prohibiting the structuring of financial transactions. Forfei-
tures are not allowed if the violation giving rise to the forfeiture is by certain regulated banks or brokerage
firms.
s 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(l)-(3); 1957(a) (Law. Co-op 1990). These sections begin with "whoever."
Therefore anyone who meets the requisite knowledge that the money involved in the transaction is from
some form of unlawful activity and the other elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 1957 are met can be charged
under these statutes. See also H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13-14; S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong.
2d Sess. at 9-15 (1986).
6 S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1986).
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population, know they are part of the problem and they could very well
be convicted of it if they knowingly take these funds. If we can make
a drug dealers money worthless, then we have really struck a chord, and
we have hit him where he bruises, and that is right in the pocketbook...
You have outstanding business people who are otherwise totally moral
who are accepting these funds and profiting greatly from drug traffick-
ing that is going on throughout this country, and this will put a stop to
it'" 7
Because these are new Federal offenses, we do not have the luxury of an
established body of case law to assist in analyzing their provisions. We must look
to legislative history, as well as related case law and statutes, and analyze those few
cases which have tested the law, to assist in interpreting the new money laundering
statutes. The remainder of this section is a brief overview of the new monel
laundering statutes.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 criminalizes almost any dealings a person might have with
the proceeds of a wide range of" specified unlawful activities" on the concealing or
disguising of the source, ownership, location, or nature of the proceeds of such
activity.' Sections 1956(a)(1) and (a)(2) are the core of the provision. Subsection
(a)(1) discusses laundering violations of illegal proceeds within a domestic context.'
Subsection(a)(2) discusses laundering violation of proceeds from a specific illegal
activity when such proceeds are transported between the U.S. and other foreign
countries or vice-versa.'0 Section 1956(a)(3) was added in 1988 to provide for
"sting" operations by government agents. Prior to this amendment, sting operations
involving government money could not be brought under § 1956 because of
§ 1956(a)(1), which requires the proceeds be "in fact" from a specified illegal
activity. I
Section 1956(b) provides for a civil penalty and will be only briefly discussed
in this paper.' 2 Sections 1956(c) sets forth many of the definitional terms of § 1956
and must be referred to in interpreting § 1956(a)(1), (2), and (3).1 Sections 1956(d),
(e), and (f) address the effects of other statutes, agency investigative responsibilities,
and extraterritorial jurisdiction, respectively."
H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1986).
'18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1990).
9 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law Co-op 1990).
1" 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
11 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(3) (Law. Co-op 1990).
12 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(b) (1990). This Subsection provides, "Whoever conducts a transaction described in
Subsection (a)(1), or a transportation of funds described in (a)(2) is liable to the United States for a civil
penalty of not more than the greater of - (1) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments
involved in the transaction; or (2) $10,000 ......
13 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c) (Law. Co-op 1990).
14 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(d), (e), (f) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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18 U.S.C. § 1957 criminalizes any "known" monetary transaction or at-
tempted monetary transaction in criminally derived property when the following
three factors exist: 1) the amount of the transaction is over $10,000; 2) a "financial
institution is involved at some point, and; 3) the property is derived from a
"specified" unlawful activity. Section 1957 does not require that the property be
used for any additional criminal purpose or that Government prove the defendant
knew that the offenses from which the criminally derived property was from a
specified unlawful activity. 15
Subsections (c), (d), and (e) amplify and refine the basic premise of § 1957(a).'6
Section 1957(f) sets forth definitional terms and must be referred to in interpreting
§ 1957(a). 17
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES
The Four Core Elements of§ 1956(a)(1): The Laundering
of Domestic Transactions
1. The First Element: Knowledge
The first element that must be proven by the government in order for it to
obtain a conviction for money laundering § 1956 is that the defendant had the
requisite knowledge; i.e., he knew the property involved in a financial transaction
represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. The government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person conducting one end of the
transaction knew that the property involved in the financial transaction represented
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.'"
The question is, what standard should be used for defining "knowledge", in
the sense that the defendant "knew" the money involved in the transaction came from
or represents the proceeds of an unlawful activity? Congress debated this issue at
some length and settled on the standard of scienter rather than a "reason to know"
standard or a "reckless disregard" standard.' 9 However, the scienter requirement that
Congress adopted is broad enough to include actions of "willful blindness. "20 For
example, if a real estate agent participates in selling a house to a person whom he
knows is reputed to be a drug dealer, and the dealer gives the agent his commission
in cash and pays for the home at the time of closing with a suitcase full of cash, the
agent would not be able to escape conviction for money laundering by simply saying
he did not "know"for sure that the cash came from a crime. It should also be noted
1 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) (Law. Co-op 1990).
16 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(c), (d), (e) (Law. Co-op 1990).
17 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957 (f) (Law. Co-op 1990).
' 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). Subsection (a)(1) provides, "Whoever, knowing that the
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.. .
19 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 6.
20 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 9-10. The Senate Report commented at length regarding the scienter
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that the drug dealer himself could be convicted for money laundering since he knew
better than anyone else that the cash used to purchase the home was the proceeds from
standard. The following is an excerpt of that discussion:
Section 1956(a)(1)--employs a scienter standard of "knowing" rather than "reason to
know" or reckless disregard. In fact, it has two "knowing" requirements in order to prove
a violation of the offense, the government must show not only that the defendant knew the
property involves in a transaction was the proceeds of a crime but also that the defendant
intended to facilitate a crime or knew that the transaction designed to conceal the proceeds
of a crime.
The "knowing" scienter requirements are intended to be contrued, like existing "knowing"
scienterrequirement to include instances of'"willful blindness." See United States v. Jewel,
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 951 (1976). Thus, a currency exchanger
who participates in a transaction with a known drug dealer involving handlers of thousands
of dollars in cash and accepts a commission far above the market rate, could not escape
conviction from the first tier offense, simply by claiming that he did not know for sure that
the currency involved in the transaction was derived from crime. On the other hand, an
automobile car dealer who sells a car at market rates to a person whom he merely suspects
of involvement in crime, cannot be convicted of this offense in the absence of a showing that
he knew something more about the transaction or circumstances surrounding it. Similarly,
the "intent to facilitate" language of the section is intended to encompass situations like
those prosecuted. The aiding and abetting statute in which a defendant knowingly furnishes
substantial assistance to a person whom he or she is aware will use that assistance to commit
a crime. See, e.g., Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940).
See also H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 7 at 13-14. The House Judiciary Committee also debated the
knowledge standard at length. The following comment reveals how the House Judiciary Committee thought
the knowledge standard should be interpreted. The following is an excerpt from the committee report
pertaining to the knowledge standard:
The comer grocer in a small community is aware of the reputation of a person who is the
local drug trafficker. That person comes to the store and buys five pounds of hamburger.
The grocer takes the cash and deposits it in his bank account with the other receipts. The
financial transaction is the act of the grocer depositing his days receipts in his bank account.
The question is whether the grocer is guilty of violating this branch of the offense.
As Mr. McCollum observed, "You [the grocer] have to know what he is coming into buy
groceries with is indeed the money derived from a particular designated crimes and to get
to that point, you would have to prove to a jury [that the grocer knew that] the fellow had
no other source of income or that [if] he had - the grocer had some more direct knowledge
that this fellow had no other source of income or that [if] he had - the grocer had some more
direct knowledge that this fellow was just standing outside on that street corner before he
came in peddling drugs, like the grocer say him doing it. [Under those circumstances] I
don't have any problem whatsoever holding the grocer accountable if he sees the guy [the
trafficker] outside dealing in drugs and takes cash and walks into his store.
Mr. Lundgren stated his understanding of the committee's use of the term "knowingly, it is
a "knowing" standard. It think it is repetitive of what Mr. McCollum said, but I think it is
extremely important. It is not, "should have known, might have known, a reasonable person
would have know, it is this person know the source of the income." Mr. Lundgren, in
reiterating the importance of this branch of offense said, "It is time for us to tell the local
trafficker and everyone else, "If you know a person is a trafficker and has this income
derived from the offense, you better beware of dealing with that person.
See also U.S. v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
[Vol. 8
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an unlawful activity. 21 This example should be contrasted with a person who merely
"suspects" that the person with whom he is transacting business is involved in a
criminal conduct. This person cannot be convicted of money laundering without the
government showing that he "knew" about the nature or purpose of the transaction. 2
Section 1956(c)(1) defines "knowing" in such a manner as to prevent a
defendant from raising the defense that he of she did not know that the proceeds
involved in the transaction were from a "specified unlawful activity" as defined by
§ 1956(c)(7), or that the defendant thought it was from a different illegal source or
a source not made illegal by the term "specified unlawful activity" as defined by
§ 1956(c)(7). All the government is required to show is that the defendant knew that
proceeds involved in the transaction were from some form of unlawful activity. The
government is not required to show that defendant knew the specific form of unlaw-
ful activity from which the proceeds involved in the transaction were derived.2 3
2. The Second Element: The Conduct or Attempt to Conduct a Transaction
The second element to be considered under § 1956(a)(1) is that the defendant
"conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction.' ' Section 1956(c)(2)
defines the term "conducts or attempts to conduct" to include initiating, concluding,
or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.25 From this language it is
apparent that Congress intended the statute to apply not only to the "initiator" of a
transaction, who usually knows that the money involved in the transaction came
from an unlawful activity, (it should be noted that the initiator of such transactions
is very often the drug dealer or principal criminal himself), but also to the other
participant in the financial transaction, pursuant to the requirement that he also know
the property involved in the transaction represents proceeds from an unlawful
activity.26 This construction by Congress of the meaning of "conducts or attempts
to conduct" through § 1956(c)(7) includes virtually any person involved in the
financial transaction, knowing that the funds involved are "dirty", i.e. came from an
unlawful activity.
It should also be noted that Congress intended the new money laundering
offense to include inchoate offenses by incorporating into § 1956(a)(1) the language
"attempts to conduct." 27 An example of an inchoate offense under § 1956 might be
21 S. REP. No. 433, supra note, at 10.
2 /d. at 10.
23 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). Subsection (c)(1) defines the term "knowingly that the
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" to
mean that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form,
of activity that constitutes a felony under State of Federal law, regardless of whether or not such activity is
a "specified unlawful activity" as defined by Subsection 1956(c)(7). See also 18 U.S.C.S. Section
1956(c)(7)(Law Co-op 1990); S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 11.
24 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
2- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
26 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 12. See also H. REP. No. 855, supra note 7, at 13-14.
27 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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where the government, through an undercover operation, obtains evidence that a
jeweler or other businessman has agreed with a drug dealer to launder drug profits
through his business. Suppose the actual laundering of drug profits never occurs, due
to the drug dealer being arrested or the government shutting down the undercover
operation through sufficient evidence to bring substantive narcotics and money
laundering charges against the drug dealer and various other persons. Even though
the businessman never "laundered" any money for the drug dealer, he may, through
the "attempt" language of the statute, be charged with money laundering under
§ 1956(a)(1).
3. The Third Element: Financial Transaction
The third element of § 1956(a)(1) is the term" financial transaction." Section
1956(c)(4) defines the term "financial transaction" very broadly. It includes
transactions which involve: 1) the movement of funds by wire or other means; 2)
one or more monetary instruments which in any way or degree affects interstate or
foreign commerce; or 3) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution
which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any way.28 A close reading of
subsection (c)(4), defining "financial transaction," informs one that within it are
many terms which must first be understood so as to fully understand its meaning and
relation to § 1956(a)(1). The several definitional terms which must be analyzed are
funds, monetary instruments, affecting interstate or foreign commerce in any way
or degree, financial institution, and transaction. Section 1956(c)(4) has as one of its
definitions of a financial transaction the, "movement of funds by wire or other
means". The meaning of funds is not defined at all by Congress, or in the legislative
history of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.29
Although not stated in the legislative history, one may assume by the
construction of the sub-definition that "movement of funds" was intended to cover
all forms of wire or other electronic transfers. 0 The remaining subpart of this
definition of financial transaction, "or other means", would therefore refer to move-
ment of funds only by other than wire or electronic means or transfers."
Section 1956(c)(5) defines the term "monetary instruments", to include any
coin or currency of the United State or any other country, along with almost any other
kind of negotiable instrument, such as personal, bank, and traveler's checks, money
28 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(4) (Law. Co-op 1990). Subsection (c)(4) states: The term financial "transaction"
means a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or involving one or more
monetary instruments, which in any way shape or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, or a
transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in or the activities which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.
29 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle H, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18;
3207-21 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1990).
30 HANoBOOK ON THE ANTI-DRuG ABUSE Acr oF 1986, U.S. Dept. of Justice - Crim. Div. 63 (1987).
31 Id. at 63-64.
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orders, and bearer and nonbearer investment securities, and other negotiable
instruments.Y "Monetary instruments" are intended as a subset of the term property
as used in § 1956(a)(1) and must be construed liberally to encompass any form of
tangible or intangible assets.33
Section 1956(c)(4) requires as part of its definition of a "financial transaction"
that a transaction, monetary instrument or wire or other transfer of funds, "affect
interstate of foreign commerce in any way or degree.' '" This requirement of
affecting interstate or foreign commerce is taken from the Hobbs Act, Title 18 U.S.C.
Section 1951.35 This term under § 1951 is intended to reflect the full force, exercise,
and reach of Congress' powers as provided under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.3 For example, if proceeds from an unlawful activity
were used to purchase a residence, such a transaction would be covered under the
term, "affect interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree", if it could be
shown that any of the materials from which the house was built can be shown to have
come from out of state. Section 1956(c)(6) defines "financial institution as having
the same meaning as defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5312 and regulations promulgated
thereunder. 31 Section 5312(a)(2) and its interpretive regulations define a financial
institution very broadly to include a Federally insured bank, a pawn broker or single
individual.39 Such a broad definition was intended in order to reach professional
money launderers.
Section 1956(c)(3) defines the term, "transaction" to include all manner of
dealing which encompass such ordinary occurrences as a purchase, sale, loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition. It also defines a "transaction"
with respect to a financial institution as an ordinary transaction in which one would
engage in with a financial institution, such as a deposit, withdrawal, transfer of
money between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit or
purchase of securities through a financial institution, as well as a number of other
32 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(5) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 13.
33 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6 at 13.
-18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(4) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444 (D.
Delaware 1980), stating the "affect of interstate commerce" is judged by examining the overall activity of
the parties involved in commerce" is judged by examining the overall activity of the parties involved in the
transactions; United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1978). only a de minimus effect on interstate
commerce is necessary to invoke jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act, and the effect need only be probably and
potential, not actual.
35 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (Law. Co-op 1990).
1 U.S. CoNsr. art. I § 8, cl. 3. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) stating that when Congress
exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause, it has made a determination that activities regulated
affect interstate commerce.
37 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (Law. Co-op 1990). For examples of nexus of interstate commerce see United States
v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
3 S. RaP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 13. See also 31 U.S.C.S. Section 5312 (Law. Co-op 1990), 31 C.F.R. §
103.11 (1989).
39 31 U.S.C.S. Section 5312(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990);.31 C.F.R. Section 1031.11(g) (1989).
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miscellaneous transactions one may have with a financial institution.'
It is interesting to note the above definition of "transaction" by § 1956(c)(3)
defines 'transaction" to mean transaction in conjunction with a financial institution
and also as a transaction not involved with a financial institution. Congress did this
intentionally so as to include almost any conceivable type of transaction known
within the ambit of this statute. Section 1956(c)(3), defines the term "financial
transaction" as not limited to transactions simple involving financialinstitutions. A
financial transaction includes all forms of commercial activity with the only require-
ment being that the transaction must "affect interstate or foreign commerce or be
conducted through or by a financial institution which is engaged in or the activities
of which affect interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.4 1 Therefore,
the important requirement in regard to a" financial transaction" is that the transac-
tion, whether through a financial institution or not must affect interstate commerce
in any way or degree.
This definition of financial transaction shows the extent and reach Congress
intended the money laundering statutes to have. Under these definitions of financial
transaction and transactions, if an individual merely transfers illegally derived
money to another individual, whether or not that money ever finds its way into a
financial institution, the person may have engaged in a "transaction" as defined by
§ 1956(c)(3) and which would comply with the first requirement of § 1956(a)(1). If
all other requisite elements of that section are met, that person may be convicted of
money laundering under § 1956.42 It should also be noted that each transaction
involving dirty money is intended to be a separate offense, no matter what the dollar
amount of the transaction, so long as the other requisite elements of § 1956(a)(1) are
met. 3
40 40. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(3) (Law. Co-op 1990). The term "transaction" is defined by subsection (c)(3)
as follows: "The term 'transaction' includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other
disposition .... Subsection (c)(3) also states: "That the term transaction with respect to a financial
institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan extension
of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any
other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected...."
41 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 13. See also 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (Law Co-op 1990).
42 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). This subsection requires a financial transaction. 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 1956(c)(3) (Law. Co-op 1990), states that the mere transfer of currency or other property qualifies as a
transaction. See also HANDBOOK ON THE Arti-DRuG ABUSE ACr OF 1986, supra note 30, at 62.
43 U.S. B. Kattan-Kassin, 696 F. 2d 893 (1 lth Cir. 1983) regarding indicting the defendant on separate counts
for each transaction. See also S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 12-13. The following is an example as to
each transaction being a separate offense: "It should be noted that each transaction involving dirty money
is intended to be a separate offense. For example a drug dealer who takes his $1 million in cash from a drug
sale and divides the money inot smaller amounts and deposits it in 10 different banks (or in 10 different
branches of the same bank) has created 10 district violations of the new statute. If he then withdraws some
of the money and uses it to purchase a boat or condominium he will have committed two more violations,
one for the withdrawal and one for the purchase of the boat or condominium."
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4. The Fourth Element: Proceeds In Fact of Specified Unlawful Activity
The fourth element of § 1956(a)(1) is the requirement that the government
prove that the proceeds which were involved in the transaction were "in fact the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity." This element will be the limiting factor
in the application of § 1956 to drug dealers, other criminal activity, and money
laundering organizations, for three reasons. First, definition of a "specified unlawful
activity", does not encompass all unlawful activity. Second, there is ajurisdictional
limitation, and third is the requirement that the Government prove that the funds are
"in fact the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity."
To understand the fourth element of § 1956(a)(1), we must first analyze
exactly what a specified unlawful activity is. Section 1956(c)(7) defines the term
"specified unlawful activity" to include: 1) any RICO predicate offense as defined
by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) except for acts indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act; 2) any foreign narcotics violations; 3) any act or acts
constituting a criminal enterprise, as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 848; and 4) any of the
enumerated criminal activities listed under § 1956(c)(7)(D).45
44 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
45 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (c)(7) (1990). This subsection reads as follows:
the term "specified unlawful activity" means
(A) any act or activity constituting an offense sisted in indictable under the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act;
(B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the United
States, an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, importa-
tion, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such term is defined for the
purposes of the Controlled Substances Act);
(C) any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise, as that term is
defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848); or
(D) an offense under § 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and claims;
bribery), § 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procurring loans), any of
§§ 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offense), § 513 (relating
to securities of States and private entities), § 542 (relating to entry of goods by
means of false statements), § 545 (relating to smuggling goods into the United
States), § 549 (relating to removing goods from Customs custody), section 641
(relating to public money, property, or records), § 656 (relating to thet, embez-
zlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee), § 657 (relating to
lending, credit, and insurance institutions), § 658 (relating to property mort-
gaged or pledged to farm credit agencies), § 666 (relating to theft or bribery
concerning programs receiving Federal funds), § 793, 794, or 798 (relating to es-
pionage), § 875 (relating to interstate communications), § 1201 (relating to kid-
naping), § 1203 (relating to hostage taking), section 1344 (relating to bank
fraud), or § 2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft) of this
title, § 2319 (relating to copyright infringement), § 310 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (21 U.S.C. 830)(relating to precursor and essential chemicals), § 590
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1590)(relating to aviation smuggling), §
1822 of the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Contro Act (100 Stat. 3207-51; 21
U.S.C. 857) (relating to transportation of drug paraphenalia), § 38(c)(relating to
criminal violations) of the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. § 2778(c)], § 11
(relating to violations of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 USCS Appx.
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Even upon a cursory reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and subparagraph (D)
of § 1956(c)(7), one can see that Congress meant for these money laundering statutes
to encompass almost any conceivable type of criminal activity which is proscribed
by Federallaw. The criminal activities which will equate with a" specified unlawful
activity" include murder, gambling, prostitution, bank fraud, bribery, welfare fraud,
securities fraud, and narcotics trafficking, just to name a few. 6 The only major
criminal activities conspicuously absent are tax evasion and the currency and foreign
transaction reporting violations. The reason for these exceptions is that there are no
identifiable proceeds under either 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 through 5326 or the income
tax law violations under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and the following sections following it,
§ 2410], § 206 (relating to penalties) of the. International Emergency Economic
Powers Act [50 USCS § 1705], or section 16 (relating to offenses and punish-
ment) of the Trading with the Enemy Act [50 USCS Appx. § 16].[.]"
46 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (c)(7)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990) refers to 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Law. Co-op 1990) which
provides:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which ischargeable under Stale law
and punishable by imprisionment for more than on year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code
[18 USCS § 1 et seq.]: § 201 (relating to bribery), § 224 (relating to sports
bribery), § 471,472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), § 659 (relating to theft
from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under § 659 is felonious, § 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), §§ 891-894 (relat-
ing to extortionate credit transactions), § 1029 (relative to fraud and related
activity in connection with access devices), § 1084 (relating to the transmission
of gambling information), § 1341 (relating to mail fraud), § 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), § 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), §§ 1461-1465 (relating to
obscene matter), § 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), § 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), § 1511 (relating to the obstruction of
State or local law enforcement), § 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness,
victim, or an informant), § 1513 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or
an informant), § 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion), § 1952 (relating to racketerring), § 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), § 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), § 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling busi-
nesses), § 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), § 1957
(relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity), § 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the
commission of murder-for-hire), §§ 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation
of children), §§ 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
motor vehicles), §§ 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
property), § 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor
vehicle parts), §§ 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),
§§ 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under
title 29, United States Code, § 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations) or § 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11,
fraud in the sale of securities of the felonious manufacture, importation, receiv-
ing, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under amy law of the United States, or (E) any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act;"
See also S. RP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 14.
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as there are under all the criminal activities included in § 1956(c)(D). The underlying
theme of §§ 1956 and 1957 is to proscribe financial transactions conducted by the
crinimal with his illegally derived income, which benefit either the criminal, his
criminal activity, or those who knowingly conduct business with the criminal. How-
ever, Congress did not include the tax and currency transaction report* (CTR)
violations, feeling such felonies were more appropriately covered by giving such
violations separate inclusion as predicate offenses in § 1956(a) (1), discussed infra."
The definition of a specified unlawful activity, although fairly broad -- encompass-
ing the racketeering offenses defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1), in addition to other of-
fenses -- does not include all criminal activity. Therefore, this definition, in and of
itself, will be a limiting factor in the application of this statute.
Secondly, § 1956 (c)(7)(b), in order to prevent jurisdictional conflicts, clari-
fies that in relation to a financial transaction, the specified offense enumerated in
§ 1956 (c) (7) (A), (C), and (D) must occur in whole or in part within the United
States, or be directed at the United States government. The singular exception is
foreign drug offenses against the law of a foreign nation. Such offenses involve the
manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substances act. Since
these offenses are part of an international crackdown on drug trafficking, they are
appropriately covered here."
Having analyzed the meaning of a specified unlawful activity and its jurisdic-
tional limitations, we must next look at the requirement that the Government prove
the proceeds in the transaction were "in fact" from a specified unlawful activity. 9
This along with the knowledge requirement, will be the biggest hurdle for the
government in bringing § 1956 violation actions. Recall that the government, under
§ 1956 (a) (1), need only establish that a defendant knew that the property was derived
from someform of felonious activity under State or Federal law. The defendant does
not have to know the specific unlawful activity from which the proceeds or property
involved or the transaction was derived.10 As stated previously, this construction
was deliberate so that a defendant could not escape conviction simply by saying he
or she thought the property involved were proceeds not covered by the term
"specified unlawful activity" or that the proceeds were from a different crime from
which the proceeds were actually derived. 51 However, § 1956 (a) (1) requires the
government to prove that the proceeds were in fact derived from one of the specified
unlawful activities under § 1956(c) (7). Proving the proceeds "in fact" were derived
from a specified unlawful activity may be a much heavier burden than showing,
usually through circumstantial evidence, that the defendant knew, or was willfully
blind to the fact, that the proceeds or property were from some unlawful activity. The
47 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (c)(7)(D) (Law. Co-op 1986). S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 14.
48 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 14.
49 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (a) (1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
S0 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (a)(1), (c)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
51 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (c)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 11.
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requirement that the government must show that the proceeds were, in fact, derived
from a "specified unlawful activity" will be a limiting factor in the application of the
statute to money laundering organizations for several reasons.
First, money laundering organizations have traditionally taken great care not
to learn or know about the illegal activity or source which produces the currency
which they are "washing." Even though the laundering operation is closely
connected with the criminal organization producing the illegal proceeds, the laun-
dering operations have very little direct involvement with the criminal organization,
so much so that only individuals within the criminal organization producing the dirty
money, or intelligence about the criminal organization could provide proof that the
proceeds the laundering operation is washingare from a specified unlawful activity,
as required by § 1956(a) (1) and defined by § 1956(c) (7). For example, the IRS
discovers that a large retail business, a jeweler, auto dealer, or grocer, is washing
large amounts of currency for a 10 percent fee by falsifying inventory figures or in-
voices and purchase orders to hide the additional currency it washes by depositing
it and then writing a check to a fictitious overseas corporation, say, in the Cayman
Islands. Due to the Cayman Islands Bank secrecy laws which protect the identity
and banking confidentiality of the fictitious corporation, the paper trail ends in the
Cayman Islands. The money trail may also end when the government is unable to
discover how or by whom the currency which is to be "washed" by the launderer is
delivered to the launderer, prior tomaking its way to the Cayman Islands, thereby,
cutting the trail off early. Therefore, in light of the above facts, the government is
unable to show that the proceeds are derived from a specified unlawful activity as
required by § 1956(a)(1) and defined by § 1956(c)(7). 2 The government will not
succeed in bringing a § 1956 charge against the launderers. However, the govern-
ment may have a good case under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), subscribing to a false tax
return charge against the launderer due to the launderer having to overstate its actual
costs on account of the surplus cash it is running through its bank accounts. 3
If the above facts are changed slightly to a less sophisticated scheme, a totally
different outcome will occur. Let's say the launderer obviously knowing that the
currency is derived from some unlawful activity, writes checks to phony domestic
corporations which are controlled by the principals of the illegal money producing
activity. By tracing the launderer's checks, the phony domestic corporation may be
identified and the owners of the sham corporations revealed through listing of
officers with the Secretary of the State in which the phony corporations are incor-
porated. The bank records of the phony corporations may then be obtained, thereby
tracing the money from the launderer to the phony corporations to the owners of the
sham corporations. Let's say one individual owns the sham corporations, and an
analysis shows the checks of these corporations going back to the owner for payment
2 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1990).
53 26 U.S.C.S. § 7206(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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of fictitious loans given by the owner to the sham corporations, thereby giving the
owner a tax free source of income. Let's further say that the owner is a reputed drug
dealer and, through investigative means, the government can show that the money
"washed" by the money laundering operation came from the sale of cocaine. Here,
the government may be able to prove that the launderer knew that the money was
from an unlawful activity, meeting the knowledge requirement of § 1956(a)(1).'
The writing of checks also meets the financial transaction requirement of § 1956(a)(1)
as defined by § 1956(c)(3) and (4).55 The launderer's actions meet the § 1956(a)(1)
requirement of conducting a financial transaction as defined by § 1956(c)(2).5 6 Most
importantly, the government, since it has proof that the currency which was "laun-
dered" was all proceeds of cocaine sales, has met the requirement that the financial
transactions, in fact, involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity as
required by § 1956(a)(1) and defined by § 1956(c) (7). 51
It should be noted that once the government shows that the financial
transaction "in fact" involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, it can
bring money laundering charges against the dope dealer and the launderer. The
language of § 1956(a) (1), "whoever knowing... conducts or attempts to conduct a
transaction with proceeds from a specified unlawful activity", includes the dope
dealer and the launderer. The dope dealer is the initiator and the launderer is a par-
ticipator of the transaction. It should be no problem for the government to show the
dope dealer knew the proceeds were from an unlawful source since he sold the
narcotics which produced the money which was laundered. The launderer, through
circumstantial evidence or direct knowledge, can also be shown to have knowledge
that the cash came from some unlawful source, although what unlawful source he
may not know. Therefore, once the government can show that the proceeds involved
in the transaction is from a specified unlawful activity and can, "trace" such
proceeds, then all persons who participated in laundering such transactions with
such proceeds knowing the proceeds to be from an unlawful activity can be
conceivably charged with money laundering for each and every transaction with
such proceeds. If there are ten laundering persons who knew the proceeds to be from
an unlawful source, but not specifically what unlawful activity, and if the govem-
ment can track such proceeds to all the launderers, the government can indict the
dope dealer and all ten launderers under § 1956(a)(1).5 Thus, the above examples
show how the language of § 1956(a)(1), which requires the proceeds of a transaction
to be, "in fact" from a specified unlawful activity, will be a significant limiting factor
to the government in its application of the statute against various criminals and
criminal activity.
- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
55 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(3)-(4) (Law. Co-op 1990).
56 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
57 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1990).
58 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990) states that, "whoever knowing..." while Subsection
1956(c)(1) defines "knowledge" or knowing. Subsection 1956(c)(2) defines the meaning of conducting a
financial transaction and Subsections 1956(c)(3)-(4) (1990) define financial transaction and transaction.
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The "in fact" requirement may also be the part of the new statute which has
been and will continue to be litigated the most.59 The question is, what does the
statute mean by requiring the proceeds to be "in fact" derived from a specified
unlawful activity? Does the statute require the government show that the exact
currency or monetary instruments involved in a transaction were the same identical
monies that the dope dealer received from his customers when he sold them the
narcotics? The legislative history of the money laundering statutes does not provide
any specific discussion regarding the requirement that the proceeds in the transaction
must be the very same currency which was derived, say, from the sale of 2 kilos of
cocaine. However, the legislative history as to the knowledge standard for § 1956
does give some examples as to what Congress may have intended by the, "in fact"
requirement of § 1956(a)(1). The following, Although discussing the knowledge
requirement sheds some light as to the requirement that the monies involved in the
transaction are in fact from a specified unlawful activity.
"You [the grocer] have to know what he [the drug dealer] is coming in
to buy groceries with is indeed the money derived from the particular
designated crimes and to get to that point, you would have to prove to
a jury [that the grocer knew that] the fellow had no other source of
income or that [if] he had another source of income - the grocer had some
more direct knowledge this fellow was just standing outside on the
street comer before he came in peddling drugs, like if [the grocer] saw
him doing it." 6o
This excerpt indicates two possible ways in which the government could
prove the proceeds are, in fact, from a specified unlawful activity. One is that the
government, by showing that the drug dealer with whom the grocer is dealing had
no other legitimate source of income and that the grocer knew this fact. The second
method is to prove that the proceeds are the very same currency generated by a single
or multiple transactions of a specified unlawful activity. This is the "direct tracing"
method, that is, to prove that the monies involved in the transaction were the very
same as directly derived from a specified unlawful activity. This example cited
above was that the grocer actually saw the person selling drugs on the street comer,
then came into his store and used the money to buy groceries. This tracing method
is obviously a more restrictive method of proof and may only be feasible in situations
where the government might have a confidential informant, undercover agent, or
member of the money laundering or criminal organization who "flips" and agree to
cooperate with the government, giving the government detailed information about
financial transactions which could further be proven through corroboration of a
paper trail.
9 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). This subsection states, "a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity .... " Id.
60 H. R. Rep. No. 855, supra note 7, at 14.
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Recent case law has been supportive of a broad or flexible interpretation of
the requirement that the proceeds be, in fact, derived from a specified unlawful
activity. In U.S. v. Blackman,6' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that §
1956 does not require the government to directly trace the proceeds involved in a
transaction to a particular sale of narcotics. In Blackman, the defendant was charged
with five counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Four of the
counts were under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for wire transfers of currency ($11,000 in total)
from Kansas City, Missouri to Los Angeles, California. The fifth charge was for
violation of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), for purchase of a truck with illegal proceeds. The
defendant was a high level cocaine dealer who was found to be in possession of a
large amount of cocaine. The interesting point in this case was that all five
transactions which made up the money laundering counts all took place a yearprior
to the defendant being found in possession of the narcotics. In this case the
government's evidence consisted of the defendant's involvement in drug trafficking
and his lack of any legitimate source of income as proof that the proceeds used in
these transactions were derived from drug trafficking. Although the individual
owned a small business, this fact was not sufficient to raise the inference that the
money wired on four separate occasions from Kansas City, Missouri to Los Angeles,
California, and the money paid to the car dealer, represented legitimately earned
income to rebut the government's contention that the proceeds were derived from
narcotics trafficking. 62
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said that although the government could
not point to a specific drug sale that produced the money used in the transactions,
the Court did not believe that the government's evidence failed to make out a claim
of money laundering under § 1956. The Court did not read the statute to require the
government to trace the proceeds to particular narcotics sale or sales. It did state,
however, that the government in bringing a charge of money laundering under
§ 1956, could not rely exclusively on proof that a defendant charged with a
transaction utilizing the proceeds from a specified unlawful activity has no legiti-
mate source of income.63 In short, Blackman holds that the government must, in
order to bring a charge of money laundering under § 1956, in a case where the
defendant had no legitimate source of income, present sufficient evidence to prove
to the jury that the money, in all likelihood, came from a specified unlawful activity.
The court in Blackman also noted that in U.S. v. Massac,4 the Third Circuit
noted that evidence of a defendants use of a wire service to transfer cash to Haiti,
combined with evidence of a defendant's drug trafficking, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction of money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In United States v.
61 United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1990).
6 Id. at 1256-1257.
3Id. at 1257.
1 United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Matra65 it was held that large sums of unexplained currency and wealth may be
circumstantial evidence of cocaine trafficking and intent to distribute cocaine. The
rulings in Blackman and Massac go to the sufficiency of the nature of the evidence
required under § 1956(a)(1) to prove that the proceeds were, "in fact" derived from
a specified unlawful activity. It is important to note several points regarding these
new statutes and the above court decisions.
First, as discussed in Blackman, in order for the government to prove the
source of the monies involved in the unlawful transaction, the statute does not
require the government to prove a case against the defendant of his substantive illegal
activity, i.e. narcotics trafficking, to show that such property involved in the
indictable transaction under § 1956 was directly derived from a specified unlawful
activity. For the statute to operate in any other manner would render it almost
useless. As discussed in Blackman, the government's burden on a particular element
of an offense may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence as long as it is sufficient
to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, Congress did not mean for
this law to be a "tag along" charge to the substantive charge. Congress' intent in
passing this statute was to provide an indirect means for the government to
investigate such criminal activity and organizations by criminalizing certain trans-
actions conducted with the proceeds from their illegal activities. Sections 1956 and
1957 are "racketeering" statutes under Chapter 95 of Title 18. This showing of the
substantive crime is consistent with other racketeering violations.
Secondly, although this is a criminal statute and the proof required for
conviction under it must be beyond a reasonable doubt, it appears from Blackman
that the evidence required to meet the "in fact" element need not be especially strong.
Recall that in Blackman, the money laundering transactions of which he was
convicted occurred a year before he was found in possession of narcotics.
Accordingly, the statutes may, indeed, provide for the government a useful tool
against sophisticated drug dealers who go to great lengths to insulate themselves
from their illegal activity, but are not always as careful as to how they use their ill
gotten income. These statutes may generally be applied effectively against criminal
activity by which the government may be able to reconstruct or trace the financial
transactions of the criminal activity or uses of income derived therefrom.
For example, say X is an upper level drug dealer and he has purchased several
legitimate going concerns with narcotics proceeds, in order to give himself a
legitimate source of income. Although X is well insulated from the purchase and
distribution of narcotics, the government may be able to get sufficient evidence that
X is an upper level dealer. In addition, the government may also be able, through
the net worth method of computing X's income, to show that X has substantially
understated his income, even though he reports substantial amounts from his
65 United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1988).
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legitimate activities. However, the government can prove that X acquired certain
large assets and purchased such businesses with large amounts of cash which was
not consistent with what X reported on his tax return at the time he made such
acquisitions. Therefore, the government may be able to show that these large
transactions could not have been financed through any legitimate source of X's
income. According to Blackman and Massac, this evidence, coupled with the
government's evidence of X's drug activity, may be sufficient to convict X of money
laundering for those transactions which cannot be proven to have been conducted
with legitimate sources. It also opens up the assets to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981, the applicability and elements of which are explained infra.1 Therefore, in
the preceding example, the government, with the passage of § 1956, can bring sub-
stantive money laundering changes, which carry a maximum of twenty years impris-
onment per count, coupled with the threat of forfeiture against X. This is a highly
potent tool for the government. Prior to the passage of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, the government might only have been able to bring tax charges
under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 or 7206, which carry only a five or three maximum prison
term per violation, respectively, and have no forfeiture provisions. 7
It should be noted that § 1956 criminalizes certain financial transactions which
are conducted for a "bad purpose". ("Bad purposes" are discussed infra.) For
example, if an assistant of X conducts transactions to help X in his business, such
as depositing cash in a nominee bank account or buying a car, and such individual
knew that the money involved in the transaction (no matter in what form, cash,
personal check, or cashier's check) came from some unlawful source, and that
unlawful source can be shown to be a specified unlawful activity as defined by §
1956(c)(7), then that individual is subject to a maximum of twenty years in prison
per count, plus a maximum fine or $500,000 or twice the value of the property
involved in the transaction in addition to forfeiture of the asset. Due to its
transactional nature and its emphasis on following a money trail and explaining a
defendant's sources of legitimate and illegitimate income, this statute may become
a favored charge to be brought by Federal agents, especially by the IRS Criminal
Division, and by Assistant United States Attorneys, against criminal organizations
and white collar criminals.
The Four Distinct Alternatives Embodied in the Fifth Element
of Proof Required by § 1956(a)(1)
In addition to the four elements of § 1 956(a)(1) already discussed, the fifth and
final element of this statute consists of four alternative choices from which the
18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (Law. Co-op 1990).
67 26 U.S.C.S. § 7201 (Law. Co-op 1990). Evasion of federal income taxes carries a maximum of 5 years
imprisonment and a macimum fine of $100, 000 for individual or $500,000 for corporation, along with the
costs of prosecution. 26 U.S.C.S. § 7206(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). This statue prescribes the subscribing to
a false income tax return which carries a maximum of 3 years imprisonment and a $100,000 for an individual
or $500,000 for corporation, along with the costs of prosecution.
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government may chose in order to fit the facts of a case so as to bring a charge under
§ 1956(a)(1). More precisely § 1956(a)(1) requires the government to prove all of
the four previously discussed elements, in addition to one of the four distinctive
alternative elements spelled out in the four subparagraphs of § 1956(a)(1): (A)(i),
(A)(ii), (B)(i), or (B)(ii). The aforementioned will be discussed in their respective
order.
1. Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) states:
"Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves
the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity -
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity."
The element added by subparagraph (A)(1) is that the defendant must
knowingly conduct of attempt to conduct a financial transaction with proceeds from
some unlawful activity, "with the intent to promote the continuation of specified
unlawful activity." The, "intent to promote" language is very similar to that used in
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). 69 Case law interpreting § 1952(a)(3) has held that the
government is not required to prove that the defendant intended to violate a specific
statute, only that the defendant intended to promote, facilitate, or further an activity
which the defendant knew that the activity was illegal. 0 Reference to State and
Federal law is then made to determine the type of activity which is unlawful." Other
case law interpreting § 1952(a)(3) has stated that the substantive, underlying crime
does not have to be actually committed or fully completed, because § 1952
proscribes the use of interstate of foreign travel facilities even to further unlawful
18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990).
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (Law. Co-op 1990). This subsection provides:
(a) "Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to -
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crim of violence to further and unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carry on, of any unlawful activity..." and
thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specitied in subparagra-
phs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
70 18 U.S.C.S. § 1952(a)(3) (1990). See also United States v. Polizzi, 550 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied 419 U.S. 112 (1985).
71 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(IXA)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286
(1969).
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activity. It does not require that actual violations of the law occur.72 An example
of the application of this new element might be where X, a drug dealer, would take
funds or profits derived from his drug activity to purchase additional narcotics, or
to purchase an automobile to transport the narcotics, or to do any other act or attempt
any act which would further or facilitate the unlawful activity, would meet this
element. If the other four elements or § 1956(a) (1) are met, then X could be
convicted under § 1956(a) (1) (a) (i).
If someone, say Y, is acting as a conduit for X's narcotics profits, and Y buys
a car or boat for X but had no knowledge that the boat or car was to aid in X's narcotics
trafficking, then Y could not be convicted of intending to promote X's unlawful
activity of narcotics trafficking. However, if Y intended to promote X's illegal
activity by buying a boat or car with money Y knew to be proceeds of X's narcotics
trafficking to further violate the drug laws, then it would be unnecessary to show that
Y knew, for example, that the car or boat was to be used to import or transport illegal
drugs. This predicate element will be especially helpful to the government in
attacking the principal criminal and those individuals who closely assist him in cases
where financial transactions can be clearly documented to promote the criminal
activity, but where the govemment has been unable to bring the substantive criminal
charge against the persons. It should be noted that transactions which help in the
"promotion" of the illegal activity can be interpreted very broadly. For example, a
marijuana dealer who is buying bales of marijuana and then repackaging the
marijuana to facilitate distribution into kilo quantities wrapped in plastic could be
convicted under this section for the transactions in which he purchases the plastic
wrap with the proceeds from the sale of the marijuana.
2. Section 1956(a)(l)(A)(ii) provides:
Whoever knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
18 U.S.C.S. § 1952 (Law. Co-op 1990). Section 1952 provides:
(a) "Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to -
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further and unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carry on, of any unlawful activity..." and
thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagra-
phs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
See also United States v. Griggs, 700 F.2d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2129 (1983);
McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274, 277, (8th Cir. 1967) (attempt to extort sufficient for travel act
conviction); United States v. Loucas, 629 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1980) (intent to violate, not actual violation of
gambling laws, was sufficient for conviction). See also United States v. Davanzo, 699 F.2d 1097 (1 lth Cir.
1983), and United States v. Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which, in fact, involves
the proceeds or specified unlawful activity -
(A) (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of
§ 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. § 7201
or 7206]. 73
The element added by subparagraph (A) (ii) is that the defendant must be
shown by the government to have knowingly conducted or attempted to conduct a
financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity with the
intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 or
7206(1).74 Subparagraph (A) (ii) was not part of the Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986, even though it had been part of Senate Judiciary Committee's draft.75 It was
amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.76 The reason for adding the new
paragraph was two-fold. One reason was to close a loophole. The other was to
effectively bring under the ambit of the new statutes third party money launderers.
The loophole was that § 1956 prohibited transactions which were designed to
conceal the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.77 However, proof of intent to
conceal the underlying specified unlawful activity is essential to obtain a conviction
under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). The big problem is that even if the drug dealer actually
did intend to conceal his illicit source of income, proof of such intent may be
impossible to obtain. Keep in mind that § 1956 as originally enacted required the
government, at a minimum, to prove a defendant's knowledge that funds represent
the "proceeds of some form of unlawful activity." However, tax crimes, such as tax
evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) or filing of a false return (26 U.S.C. § 7206), unlike other
n 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Law. Co-op 1990).
74 26 U.S.C.S. § 7201 (Law. Co-op 1990). § 7201 provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty
of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shalled be fired not more than $100,000
($500,000 in case of a corporation) or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution).
26 U.S.C.S. Section 7206 (Law. Co-op 1990). Subsections (1) and (2) provide that:
Any person who-
(1) Declaration under penalties of peijury. Willfully makes and subscribes any return,
statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it
is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct
as to every material matter, or (2) Aid or assistance. Willfully aids or assists in, or procures,
counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter
arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return affidavit, claim, or other document,
which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud
is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return,
affidavit, claim, or document; or...
7 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 11-12.76 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, Title VI, Subtitle N, § 6471 (a), (b) (1988).
" 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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crimes, have no identifiable "proceeds." Therefore, the government is unable to use
the originally enacted § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) to prosecute individuals who launder
illegal proceeds for the purpose of tax evasion.78
This "intent" loophole of § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) was addressed by Congress and
subsequently amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 by the passage of
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). The following paragraph illustrates this "intent" loophole
lurking in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and how the passage of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) closes this
loophole.
A drug dealer will place assets, such as real estate, bank accounts, autos,
restaurants, and bars, in nominee names so as disguise their true ownership from the
Internal Revenue Service. Therefore, the drug dealer, through such actions, is
promoting the crime of income tax evasion. However, the government is required
to establish proof of intent to conceal the underlying specified unlawful activity in
order to bring a charge under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). Such proof may be very difficult
to obtain, even if the drug dealer did intend to conceal his illicit source of income,
especially as in many cases, the drug dealer is counseled by his financial advisor,
accountant or attorney to own a legitimate business to create a source of appearance
of a legitimate source of income. In addition, the high level drug dealer is insulated
from the crime he finances by layers of subordinates including street dealers and
money launderers, which makes it even more difficult to prove that he intended to
conceal his illicit source. Therefore, proof that the individual laundered money with
the intent to conceal his or her unreported income (which is why he would go to such
trouble of putting assets into nominee names) from the IRS may be the only
knowledge element provable.79
It should be noted that this new offense could not be used against ordinary
taxpayers who evade taxes or legitimately eamed income. The govemment is still
required to prove under § 1956(a)(1) that the source of funds, in fact, represents the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity. 0 The garden variety tax evasion or a false
tax return violation by one who skims proceeds or writes off personal expenditures
does not fit the definition of a specified unlawful activity, nor are they the type of
violation which produce or generate illegal income. In fact, they are just the
opposite. In short, what this provision proscribes is the "hiding" of illegally and
legally generated income.
The second reason for adding this subsection was to include third party money
7 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 11-12; Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Regulations
Implementing the Bank Secrecy Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1987) [hereinafter "Hearings"] (testimony of William F. Weld, Asst. Att'y. Gen.,
Criminal Div.).
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laundering within the ambit of § 1956. Professional money launderers go to great
lengths to avoid knowledge of the actual illegal source of the cash that they launder.
However, such launderers have been known to be very careless in knowing that their
services facilitate tax evasion. Indeed, that is what their services provide. Money
launderers will in rendering their services, provide their customers with documents
such as false loan statements, set up false corporations of other fictitious entities to
give the appearance that the source of funds are "clean" ornontaxable, such as loan
proceeds. A launderer who knowingly provides such services facilitates the crimes
of tax evasion and filing of false income returns, but ignores the actual illegal source
of funds, should bear the risk that the money may be from a "specified unlawful
activity." Therefore if the funds are from a specified unlawful activity, the launderer
should be subject to the money laundering charges in addition to the conventional
tax and conspiracy charges.81
A third reason, and corollary to the first reason, is that without this new
subsection describing transactions which would be violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201
and 7206, a drug dealer charged with an offense under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) could be
provided with a defense that he laundered the money with the intent to conceal it from
the IRS, i.e. promote a tax crime and not with intent to hide the proceeds of a specified
unlawful activity. Without such a provision the professional money launderer and
drug dealer might escape prosecution under Section 1956.82
This subsection will be a particularly powerful tool for the IRS Criminal
Investigation Division to use in its criminal tax investigations. The following is
illustrative of how the IRS Criminal Division might use this provision in its Grand
Jury and administrative investigations: X is a high level drug dealer. He has been
a dealer for the better part of ten years. X has been advised by accountants and
attorneys to how launder his illegal proceeds and avoid the currency transaction
report (CTR) filing requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5313.83 X has amassed a
considerable fortune, amounting to several million dollars, through the operation of
his narcotics organization. X has quite an elaborate organizational structure with
many individuals who are loyal to him, which has allowed him to operate without
interruption by the local, State, or Federal drug authorities. X has also obtained the
advice and services of an accountant who sets up various entities to give X an
apparent legitimate source of income, along with shifting of assets to nominees so
as not to alert the IRS. The IRS, however, can prove through the net worth method
that X has substantially understated his income for several years prior to and after
the passage of § 1956.
Prior to the new statutes the government might only be successful in bringing
charges of tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) or subscribing to a false income tax return
91 Id. at 33.
2 Id. at 34.
31 U.S.C.S. § 5313 (Law. Co-op 1990).
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(26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). With these charges, X might end up serving a maximum of
five years in prison for the several counts of tax evasion, along with some fines and
an order to pay over a certain amount of the tax. The investigation of X would have
most likely been conducted under the auspices of a Federal Grand Jury. If this is the
manner of investigation, the IRS Civil Examination and Collection divisions would
have had to wail until the entire criminal process took its course before it could civilly
assess additional tax and then attempt to collect that tax. During this time X might
have been able to keep the bulk of his assets, by shifting and hiding it so as to frustrate
the civil function of the IRS in collection such tax. At the very lease, X most likely
still have a good portion of his wealth intact when he completes his prison term.
In contrast to the above example, under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), the IRS may be
able to prove that X has no legitimate source of income, and as stated above,
recompute his income through the net worth method to show that X has substantially
understated his income. Let's say, for example, the government has been able to
acquire evidence to prove the four elements of § 1956(a)(1), that is X knowingly
conducted myriads of financial transactions with the proceeds of his narcotics
activity which, in fact, involved the proceeds from a specified unlawful activity, X's
narcotics trafficking. In fact, the government has proof against X's accountant and
attorney who helped him launder his drug profits, that they knew the money was
from an unlawful source. Thus, they too are subject to indictment under
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). The government may bring not only the conventional tax
evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) and or filing of false returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) charges
against X, it may bring numerous money laundering counts against X under § 1956
(a)(1)(A)(ii), for engaging in transactions with the intent to engage in conduct
constituting violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206. In addition, much of X's wealth is
subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982.
X's attorney and accountant may also be indicted, again, not only on the
traditional counts of filing false returns and conspiracy (26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), and
18 U.S.C. § 371), but also on money laundering charges under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
X and his financial advisors will not be facing short prison terms, since each money
laundering count carries with it a maximum of twenty years imprisonment. This
example shows with stark clarity the powerful tool § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) may become
for the government, especially to the IRS Criminal Division, in investigations of
individuals involved in narcotics or any other specified unlawful activity.
Although the above examples have concentrated on the advantage of coupling
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(l 1) with an ordinary tax investigation utilizing the net worth
method of calculating the drug dealers income, it should be noted that
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(1l) only require one transaction or attempted transaction which
would constitute a violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 or 7206. For example, transac-
tions using nominee names to hide bank accounts or property purchased by X with
the illegal profits would constitute conduct that would be in violation of § 7201 for
1991]
25
Kacarab: Money Laundering Statutes
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
tax evasion. It is much easier and less time consuming for the IRS Criminal Divi-
sion to document one transaction constitution conduct of tax evasion or subscribing
to a false tax return. The new money laundering statutes may enable the IRS
Criminal Division to bring many more convictions in the same amount of time, in
addition to increasing the amount of forfeitures, utilizing 18, U.S.C. § § 981 and 982.
For example, in the course of a tax investigation involving any individual involved
in a specified unlawful activity, all the IRS must do is to find transactions which
constitute conduct violative of § § 7201 and 7206, develop the requisite evidence to
show the individual derives his income, or a majority of his income from the speci-
fied unlawful activity (to meet the elements of Blackman, discussed supra), and
show that the proceeds involved in the transactions which are violative of § § 7201
or 7206 are derived from a specified unlawful activity. If this can be accomplished
then the IRS has required proof to meet the elements of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and can
prosecute the individual under this provision, in addition to civilly forfeiting the
asset involved in the transaction under 18 U.S.C. § 981. In fact, the Government
may even get X to plead guilty to one or more tax evasion or false return charges in
a plea bargain agreement. X will probably agree to such a plea due to the significant
prison on terms of the money laundering statute.
Conviction under the money laundering statutes contains a minimal jail term
which is about five time greater than that of tax evasion and, in all probability, the
defendant most likely will not have to serve any additional time for the tax charge
since the judge will more than likely order the period of incarceration for the tax
offense to be served concurrently with the period of incarceration for money
laundering.84 Although §§ 1956 and 1957, specifically § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), will not
terminate the IRS Criminal Division's mission of working pure tax investigations
for the tax deterrence effect, it will definitely have an effect on how the Division will
prioritize and evaluate its investigations and as to which charge it will recommend
to the Department of Justice for prosecution.
3. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) states:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conduct or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity -
(B) Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
84See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUDELINES MANUAL, (November 1, 1987). P.L. 98-473, § 235,
reprinted and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1990). Comparison of base level offense for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956 is 20 or 23 depending on which subsection is charged. A base level of 20 is 33 to 41 months
mandatory incarceration. This should be compared with the base level for tax evasion, which is 12. A base
level of 12 requires 10 to 16 months of mandatory time.
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ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.85
The element this subsection added is that the defendant must have conducted
or attempted to conduct a financial transaction "knowing that the transaction was
designed in whole or in pant... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity."
Close attention to the language of this subsection, as with § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), reveals
that the government is not required to prove that the defendant have knowledge that
the concealment or disguise was with proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.
Rather, the government is only required to prove the defendant knew that the
transaction was designed to conceal the nature, location, source, or ownership, or
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. The government is still
required to show that the proceeds were, in fact, from a specified unlawful activity.
This subsection has been said to encompass the essence to the crime of money
laundering. This subsection would make it an offense to engage in a commercial
transaction (which includes financial transactions, purchases or sales of property, or
the creation of debts) knowing that the transaction is part of a scheme to conceal
criminally derived property or to disguise the source, ownership, or control over the
criminally derived property.
The subsection proscribes, for example, the actions of a lawyer who deposits
funds or exchanges stock in the course of creating a dummy corporation for the
purchase or sale of property, or aids in the sale of property, knowing that such actions
are part of someone's scheme to conceal the proceeds of a crime could be charged
with money laundering. This means that stock brokers, real estate agents, auto
dealers, jewelers, precious metals dealers and so forth, who make sales or engage in
transactions that they know are part of a scheme to conceal the nature of the property,
or to disguise the source or ownership of or control over criminally derived property,
are guilty of money laundering.86
This subsection and newly created § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) may often dovetail each
other, depending upon the facts and circumstances and the purpose behind the
transaction. Although one may conjure up a myriad of examples which may be
indictable through the language of this subsection, the following illustrates only one
examples: Drug dealer X puts substantial proceeds of drug sales in his father's
accounts. X's father, F, alone has signatory control over the accounts. As to X, there
should be no difficulty in showing that he had the knowledge that the funds were
derived from a specified unlawful activity. As to F, if F does not know that the
purpose for putting the money in his name was to disguise the ownership, control,
source, etc., of the funds, (hardly unlikely) F could not be prosecuted under this
subsection section. However, if F knew the money was put in his name to disguise
18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990).
9 H.R. REP. No. 186, supra note 90, at 15.
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the nature, location, control, or source of the proceeds of the unlawful activity, even
if F did not know the specific unlawful activity which generated the funds, F could
still be prosecuted under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
4. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) provides:
Whoever knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which, in fact, involves
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-
(B) Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part -
(ii) To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law. 8
7
This subsection was directed generally, although not exclusively, toward the
professional money launderer and his "smurfs," in violating the currency transaction
reporting (CTR) requirements under 31 U.S.C. § § 5313 and 5324. Itcan also be used
against merchants and other individuals required to file form 8300 under 26 U.S.C.
§ 60501, (relating to cash transactions over $10,000 received in a trade or business).
Again, under this subection, as with §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), there
is no requirement for the government to prove that the defendant knew that the
money involved in the financial transaction was in any way derived from, or
connected to, a specific unlawful activity. This means that a money launderer and
his "smurfs" (those who go to banks depositing cash into accounts in amounts under
$10,000, or buying bank checks or money orders for similar amounts to avoid the
filing or currency transaction report) will be violation of this subsection. The
government does not have to show that they knew that the funds were derived from
some unlawful activity as defined in § 1956(c)(7). Although the defendant may be
unaware that the funds were actually derived from one or more specified unlawful
activities, the govemnentmust still show that the money involved in the transaction
was in fact derived from some specified unlawful activity.
Although the intricacies of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316, 5322, and 5324 (the
currency transaction reporting (CTR) requirements for cash transaction in excess of
$10,000) and 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (which requires IRS form 8300 to be filed when
more than $10,000 cash is received by the provider in exchange for those goods or
services) are beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that these statutes
and Section 1956 and 1957 will complement each other in attacking criminal activity
in that, among all of the statutes, almost every type of financial transaction conceiv-
able is covered. In addition, § § 1956 and 1957 increase the maximum jail sentence
- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(ii) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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from 5 years to 20 and 10 years, respectively, for transactions which would violate
Title 31, since Title 31 violations are predicate acts under § 1956. In addition, a
person can still be charge with a both a CTR violation and a money laundering count
pursuant to § 1956(d) for the same activity, if the property involved in the transaction
is derived from a specified unlawful activity. Additionally, both the CTR's and
money laundering statutes subject a defendant to the forfeiture provisions of 18
U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982. In short, these statutes taken together present the govern-
ment's law enforcement agencies with effective tools by which to indirectly
investigate substantive Federal crimes.
The Prohibition Against the International
Transportation of Monetary Instruments
Section 1956(a)(2), in contrast to § (a)(1), criminalizes the transportation of
monetary instruments into or out of the United States, thereby proscribing intema-
tional money laundering transactions. Subsection 1956(a)(2) states:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place
in the United States from or through a place outside the United States--
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part--
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, orthe control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law.88
This subsection covers such transactions as when a person transports or attempts to
transport monetary instruments or funds out of or into the United State for illegal
purposes.89
Similarto § 1956(a)(1) with its four alternative predicate offenses upon which
a violation can occur, § 1956 (a)(2) has only three bases upon which the government
can charge a violation. Again, similar to § 1956(a)(1), all three alternatives have the
18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
89 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(5) (Law. Co-op 1990) (defining monetary instruments). See discussion of
monetary instruments in Section A, supra. Subsection 1956(a)(2) uses the term "funds." Although not
defines by the statute, the context in which it is used would indicate that the term apply to wire transfers or
any other electronic fund transfers. See discussion on fund in Section A, supra notes 29-32.
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same common "root" or basic element. That is, there must be a transportation,
transfer, or transmittal, or attempted transportation, transfer, or transmittal of a
monetary instrument or funds out of or into the United States 0
Once a transportation or attempted transportation of a monetary instrument or
funds in or out of the United States has been established by the government, then one
of the three following alternative elements must be proven. These alternatives are
spelled out in the three subparagraphs of § 1956(a)(2):(A), (B)(i), and (B)(ii). These
three alternatives elements will be analyzed in their respective order.
1. Section 1956(a)(A) states:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfers monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States orto a place
in the United States from or through a place outside the United States -
(A) With the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful
activity:91
This first of the three alternative elements requires that the transportation,
transmission, or transfer, of attempted transportation, transmission, or transfer be
carried out with the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity.
Note that subparagraph (A) does not, unlike § 1956(a)(1)(A), require that the
monetary instrument or funds be the product of an unlawful activity.' The
government must only establish that the funds which the defendant transported,
transmitted, or transferred, or attempted to transport, transmit, or transfer were
intended to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity. 93
90 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 13. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained the definition of monetary
instrument as follows:
Section 1956(c)(5) defines the term "monetary instruments" to include coin or
currency of the United States or of any other counrty, traveler's checks, personal checks,
bank checks, money orders, investment securities in such form that little thereto passes
upon delivery, and negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title
thereto passes upon delivery. The definition would also include cashier's checks. The
phrase "coin or currency" is also intended to include gold or other precious metal coins,
which are the legal tender of a country but which do not normally circulate as such, or whose
value is determined by the worth of their metallic content rather than by the operation or
normal currency exchange markets. "Monetary instruments" are a subset of the term
"property" as used in section (a), a term that is intended to be construed liberally to
emcompass any form of tangible or intangible assets.
91 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990).
9 This is because Subsection 1956(a)(2) lacks the language of Subsection 1956 (a)(1). That requires the
person conducting the transaction know the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity.
s 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also supra Section III, Part A, for a discussion on
Subsection 1956(a)(1)(A).
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The fact that the government does not have to show that the funds or monetary
instrument involved are from specified unlawful activities is very advantageous for
several reasons. First, this provision will be a very useful tool in working very large
or high echelon drug dealers. Secondly, it may be used against the couriers of
professional money launderers or the money launderers themselves. For example,
X, a high level drug dealermay be so well insulated, through multiple layers of street
dealers and other individuals, as to be virtually untouchable, so that the government
could not bring substantive drug charges against X. In addition, X has a profitable,
legitimate business to explain his wealth and source of income in addition to
structuring his assets and finances so that the IRS would probably be precluded from
bringing tax charges against X. However, the government has obtained evidence,
say through a wire tap and other investigative means and it finds that X is wiring
money from the accounts of these legitimate businesses, to offshore banks and then
to the supplier of the narcotics, say, in Columbia. If the government is able to
corroborate these transactions and their purpose, even though the money cannot be
determined to be from a specified unlawful activity, then X may be indicted under§ 1956(a)(2)(A) because the government can show a transmission of funds from a
place in the United States to a place out of the United States, i.e. Columbia. The
evidence which the government has regarding the wiring of funds and their alleged
purpose to buy narcotics in Columbia, along with evidence from individuals
testifying as to X's drug business and drug shipments coming from Columbia,
should fulfill the requirement that such funds were intended to promote the carrying
on a specified unlawful activity. 94
The absence of a requirement upon the government to prove that the monetary
instruments or funds are the proceeds of an unlawful activity may allow for the use
of government "sting operations" with Federal undercover agents. Secondly, if an
individual or domestic money laundering organization was willing to launder its
"customers"' illegal proceeds by transporting currency out of the country, transmit-
ting the funds through wire or other electronic transmission out of the country, or
transferring funds through other means out of the United States, or any attempt at
transporting, transmitting, or transferring, the government would not be precluded
from bringing a viable § 1956(a)(2)(A) charge if the government can prove that the
purpose of the transportation, transfer, or transmission of the currency provided by
the government in the sting operation was expressly to promote the carrying on of
the specified unlawful activity as defined by § 1956(c)(7).
2. Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers or attempts to transport,
transmit or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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United States to or through a place outside the United States from or
through a place outside the United States -
(B) Knowing that the monetary instruments or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part -
(i) To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of a specified unlawful
activity. 95
This subsection differs from § 1956(a)(2)(A) by adding to it two elements of
proof which the government must establish in order to bring a conviction under it.
The first additional element requires that the monetary instrument or funds involved
in the transportation, transmission, or transfer, or attempted transportation, trans-
mission, to transfer, represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and
that the defendant have knowledge that the monetary instrument or funds involved
were from an unlawful activity. 96 The analysis which is done for § 1956(a)(1)
prosecutions applies with equal force to § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and should therefore be
utilized and applied for all § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) prosecutions.
The second element added to § 1956(a)(2)(BXi) is that, as under § 1956(a)(1)(BXi),
it must be proven that the transportation, transmission, or transfer, or attempted
transportation, transmission, or transfer was designed in whole or in part to "conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or control of the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.'" 9 The Senate Judiciary Committee
commented that the knowledge and proof requirements under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) are
identical to its counterparts in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).98
The requirement that the completed or attempted transportation, transmission,
or transfer be undertaken to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity may be
most easily proven by an event which calls for the filing of a CMIR report (Report
of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instrument)." Generally,
93 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990).
9618 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990). See supra Section III, Part A, for discussion on Subsection
1956(a)(1) requiring proof that the property involved in a transaction were the proceeds of a specified
unlawful activity.
97 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Law. Co-op 1990). See supra Section III, Part A, for a discussion on 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
" S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 11. The applicable commentary form the Judiciary Committee Report
reads as follows:
As with the prior section, the knowledge requirement of this section should be construed
to encompass instances of "willful blindness"; and the "intent to facilitate" language
should also be construed in accord with Backun v. United States, supra.
"31 U.S.C.S. § 5315 (Law. Co-op 1990); 31 C.F.R. 103.23 (1989).
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a CMIR (Customs Form 4790) must be filed by an individual with the United States
Customs Service when he is transporting more than $10,000 in cash into or out of
the United States. Drug dealers and money launderers employ great care and
ingenuity in devising myriads of ways to get cash out of this country undetected by
the Customs Service and into offshore banks in tax havens or for payment fordrugs.
Obviously, the drug dealer is not going to file a CMIR each time he transports
over $10,000 in cash out of the U.S. Indeed, he wants to avoid this requirement at
all costs. Therefore, each time such an individual fails to file a CMIR, that person
has, by afortiori, concealed the location of the monetary instrument, as defined by
§ 1956(c)(5).10 As one can see from this example, this subsection will provide the
government with a flexible tool to prosecute those money launderers whose schemes
and illegal activity include the international transportation of currency. The
application of this section will be limited only by the myriad of schemes professional
money launderers can concoct to get drug profits out of this country and the
government's activity to uncover such schemes.
3. Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) states:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transport a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to a place outside the United States or to a place in the
United States from or through a place outside the United States -
(B) Knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part -
(ii) To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or Federal
law.101
This subsection, like § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), requires evidence that the monetary
instrument or funds involved in the completed or attempted transportation, transfer,
or transmission represents the proceeds or attempted transportation, transfer, or
transmission represents the proceeds or some form of an unlawful activity."°
Although this section does require the defendant to have knowledge that the
monetary instrument or funds involved are derived from some unlawful activity,
there is no requirement that the funds or monetary instruments be the profits or
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, as required by §§ 1956(a)(1) and
(a)(2)(B)(i). In addition to this requirement that the defendant have knowledge of
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(5) (Law. Co-op 1990).
101 8 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Law. Co-op 1990).
" See supra Section III, Part A, for a discoussion of Subsection 1956(a)(1) and the knowledge requirement
relating to "unlawful activity."
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the proceeds coming from some unlawful activity, the government must prove that
the "transaction" was designed in whole or in part, "to avoid a transaction reporting
requirement under State or Federal law." 0 3
The prior example illustrating § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), in which an individual
transports currency in or out of the United States, fits § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii), perhaps
even better than it fits § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Therefore, all that has to be proven under
this section is that there was a completed or attempted transportation, transmission,
or transfer by the defendant, and in addition (1) that the defendant knew that the
monetary instrument or funds consisted of the proceeds of some unlawful activity
and (2) that the movement of such funds or monetary instruments in or out of the
country was to avoid a reporting requirement under State or Federal law. °1 In reality,
this section takes a violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316, or 5324 and adds the
requirement that the government prove the defendant knew that the funds or
monetary instruments in the transaction were derived from some form of unlawful
activity.0I The defendant, instead of facing a maximum of five years per count under§ 5316, now faces a maximum of twenty years per count under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
In fact according to § 1956(d) the defendant could still be charged with a violation
of Section 5316 in addition to the § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) violation.0 6
103 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Law. Co-op 1990). See supra Section III Part A, for a discussion of
subsection 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) for an explanation of the meaning of subparagraph (B)(ii) as to a transaction
reporting requirement under State or Federal Law.
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Law. Co-op 1990).
10s See supra, note 2 for a discussion of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5324. In addition, 31 U.S.C.S. § 5316 (Law.
Co-op 1990), provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person or an agent or bailee of
the person shall file a report under subsection (b) of this section when the person, agent,
or bailee knowingly-
(1) transports or has transported montary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time-
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside th United States; or
(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States; or(2) received monetary instruments of more than $5,000 at one time transported into the
United States from or through a place outside the United States.(b) A report under this section shall be filled at the time and place the Secretary of the
Treasury prescribes. The report shall contain the following information to the extent
the Secretary prescribes:
(1) the legal capacity in which the person filling the report is acting.
(2) the origin, destination, and route of the monetary instruments.(3) when the monetary instruments are not legall and beneficially owned by the person
transporting the instruments, or if the person transporting the instruments personally
is not going to use them, the identity of the person that gave the instruments to the
perosn transporting them, the identity fo the person who is to receive them, or both.
(4) the amount and kind of monetary instruments transported.
(5) additional information.
106 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(d) (Law. Co-op 1990). § 1956(d) provides that, "Nothing in this seciton shall
supercede any provision of Federsl, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil
remedies in addition to those provided for in this section.
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Section 1956(d) does not supersede any provision of Federal or State law
imposing criminal or civil penalties in addition to those provided in § 1956(d).
Therefore, a person can be charged with any violation under § 1956 along with
narcotics violations and/or a violation of the tax laws under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 or
7206 for evasion of Federal income taxes or for subscribing to a false tax return,
respectively, or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act for causing a financial institution
to file a currency transaction report (CTR). 107
The Sting Provision
Section 1956(a)(3) creates a sting provision where by the government can
introduce a Federal agent or person controlled by a Federal agent in an undercover
capacity to a professional money laundererwho will then" wash" the alleged "drug
profits" for the undercover agent, thereby violating § 1956(a)(3).I'l This subsection
was not part of § 1956 as it was originally created by the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986. Subsection (a)(3) was not added until 1988, when Congress passed the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.19 In short, the reason for the passage by Congress
of this subsection was due to the language of § 1956(a)(1) requiring that the property
involved in the transaction must "in fact" involve the proceeds of a specified
unlawful activity. 1 ' This requirement of § 1956(a) (1) effectively precluded the
government from having its agents pose as drug dealers so they could approach
professional money launderers to wash their "drug profits" were not "in fact" from
a specified unlawful activity but were government funds allocated for such under-
cover operations, and in no way was the money "in fact" dirty money. Therefore,
in such undercover operators the only charges that could possibly be brought against
0 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 defines financial institution fairly broadly. The definition of financial institution
follows. Note especially section (i)(3) which has been used by the Governments and interpreted by the
courts to include professional maony launderers:
(5)(g)Financial institution. Each agent, angency, branch, or office wihtin the United States
of any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an organized
business concern, in one or more of the capacities listed below.
(1) A bank (except bank crdit card systems);
(2) A broker or dealer in securities;
(3) A currency dealer or exchanger, including a personal engaged in the business of a
check casher,
(4) An issuer, seller, or redeemer of traveler's checks or money orders, except as a selling
agent exclusively who does not sell more than $150,000 of such instruments within
any given 30-day period;
(5) A licensed transmitter of funds, or other person engaged in the business of transmit-
ting funds;
(6) A telegraph company;
(7)(i) A casino orgambling casino licensed as a casino or gambling casino by a State or local
government and having gross annual gaming revenue in excess fo $1,000,000.
(ii) A casino or gambling casino includes the principal headquarters and any nbranch or
place of business of the casino or gambling casino.
(8) A person subject ot supervision by any state or federal bank supervisory;
(9) The United States Postal Service with respect to the sale of money orders.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(3) (1990)
,"The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 88, Subtitle N, § 6465.
1o 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (1) (1990).
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such individuals would have been tax violations or violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324,
for" structuring" the alleged dope profits so as to avoid the CTR requirements when
the launderer was cleaning the money so as to bring it back to the drug dealer as
"clean money." 11 31 U.S.C. § 5324 only carries with it a maximum of five years
imprisonment (which can be elevated to ten years under certain circumstances),
versus a maximum of twenty for a § 1956 violation.
Congressional recognition of this problem, which subsequently resulted in the
addition of § 1956(a)(3), can be seen in the following passage:
First, 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a) (1) makes it an offense to conduct a
financial transaction which "in fact" involves the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity. The "in fact" language precludes use of government
"sting" operations to investigate this offense. A sting operation woould
involve a government agent posing as a criminal -- a narcotics traf-
ficker, for example -- and giving government money to a money laun-
derer for the purpose of conducting a financial transaction. Such an
investigative technique cannot be used because the money would not
"in fact" be the proceeds of unlawful activity." 2
Section 1956(a)(3) provides:
Whoever, with the intent-
(A) To promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
1 31 U.S.C.S. § 5324 (1990). Section 5324 provides:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of § 5313(a) with
respect to such transaction-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report
required under § 5313(a);
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report required
under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact;
or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring,
any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
31 C.F.R. 103.11(p) defines structuring as:
Structure (structuring). For purposes of section 103.53, a person structures a transaction if
that person, acting alone, or in conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts
or attempts to conduct one or more transaction in currency, in any amount, at one or more
financial institutions, on one or more day, in any manner, for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements under § 103.22 of this Part. "In any manner" includes, but is not
limited to, the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller
sums, including sums at or below $10,000, or series of currency transactions, including
transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction or transactions need not exceed the
$10,000 reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single financial
institution on any single day in order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this
definition.
112 H.R. REP. No. 864, Section 100th Cong. 2d. Sess. 9 (1988).
AKRON TAX JOURNAL [Vol. 8
36
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 8 [1991], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol8/iss1/1
MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTES
(B) To conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity;
(C) To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal
law;
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving
property represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate
specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
for not more than 20 years, or both. For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "represented" means any representation made by a law enforce-
ment officer or by another person at the direction of, or with the approval
of, a Federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of
this section."13
Again, we have the core requirement of the entire statute, that is, a financial
transaction, being coupled with three alternative predicate offenses to form the basis
of this subsection. However, there are some interesting differences in § 1956(a)(3).
First, this subsection uses the term "intent" instead of "knowledge" for the
measurement of mens rea. The choice by Congress of the word "intent" appears to
indicate that Congress deliberately wanted to make this sting provision applicable
to a specific intent crime to be limited to the three familiar alternative predicates
which have been discussed supra, and are listed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)
of § 1956(a)(3). Subparagraph (A) deals with those individuals who have the
specific intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. Subpara-
graph (B) deals with those individuals who intend to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity. Subparagraph (C) deals with those individuals intend-
ing to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law. 1 4 The
only difference between these alternative predicate offenses as used in § 1956(a)(1)
is the language toward the end of subsection (a)(3)(B) as compared with that of
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). This wording in subparagraph (B), ".... or control of property
believed to be the proceeds or specified unlawful activity..." is necessary to get
around the original reason why § 1956(a)(1) could not be used in a sting operation
because the property involved in the transaction was not, "in fact" proceeds of a
specified unlawful activity. In a government sting operation, the defendant must be
shown to have acted with the specific intent required, that is, believing the property
to be proceeds of specified unlawful activity." 5
113 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (3) (1990).
114 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(3)(A), (B), and (C) (1990). See supra Section III, Part A for a discussion of
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
11- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (3) (B) (1990). See also H.R. REP. No. 864, supra note 121, at 8-11.
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The remaining part of § 1956(a)(3) requires that the defendant conduct or
attempt to conduct a financial transaction in either of two ways: (1) the defendant
conducts or attempts to conduct financial transaction with property which has been
represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity," 6 or (2) the defendant conducts or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction involving property represented by a law enforcement officer to conduct
or facilitate a specified unlawful activity." 7
Section 1956(a)(3) defines the term " represented" as meaning any represen-
tation made to the defendant by a law enforcement officer or by another person at
the direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to investigate
or prosecute violations of § 1956.118 Therefore, the person making the representation
to the defendant can be a Federal agent, State law enforcement officer, or confidential
or controlled informant."19
One additional interesting note is that Congress did not include in § 1956(a)
(3) the language of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), that is, conduct or financial transactions
which constitute tax evasion or subscribing to a false income tax retum. 120 One
would think that such a provision would be natural for sting operations by the IRS.
For example, the IRS Criminal Division may be able, through investigative means,
to determine whether a certain CPA, attorney, or accountant prepares oris preparing
the tax returns for locally reputed organized crime figures or alleged drug dealers.
An undercover agent could pose as a drug dealer "shopping" the tax preparer for
advice in hiding his money from the IRS, getting the preparer's assistance in setting
up a scheme to assist the "drug dealer" in hiding his assets, or even in the preparation
of the undercover agent's tax return. Any number of scenarios could be imagined.
However, although § 1956(a)(3) was put into law the same time § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii)
was enacted, there was no discussion by Congress of an extension of § 1956(a)(3).
Thus, Congress must not have felt it was necessary to add the language of
subparagraph (A) (ii) to § 1956(a)(3).
Throughout the legislative history of the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, there
was no discussion as to the addition of the language of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) to
§ 1956(a)(3)."2' Apparently, Congress must have felt that the language of
§ 1956(a)(3)(B), that is, to conceal or disguise the nature, location etc., of the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, was sufficient for sting operations of
professional money launderers and those who assist the criminals in hiding their ill
11 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(3) (1990).
117 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(3)(A), (B), and (C) (1990).
I's 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c) (7) (1990). This subsection defines a specified unlawful activity. See also 18
U.s.C.s. § 1956(a) (3) (1990).
19 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (3) (1990).
120 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1990).
12' H.R. REP. No. 864, supra note 121, at 8-11. See also H.R. REP. No. 169, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 30-35
(1987).
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gotten gains. Perhaps Congress did not want the statute to extend to such
investigations, or such an extension of § 1956(a)(3) was an oversight by Congress.
In fact, failur by Congress to include the language of § 1956 (a)(1)(A)(ii) may give
a professional money launderer a defense through the "loophole" of the language of
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) discussed supra, in that the launderer could say his intent was to
avoid payment of tax to IRS, rather than to conceal, disguise, etc.
Penalties for Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956
The criminal penalty for violating either § 1956(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) is a
maximum sentence of twenty years in prison for each count. Sections 1956(a)(1) and
(a)(2) also carry and a maximum fine of $500,000 or twice the value the property in-
volved in the transaction, whichever is the greater. 22 Section 1956(a)(3) does not
specifically state that the fine shall be $500,000 or twice the value of the property
involved, whichever is greater, only that the individual shall be fined under title 18,
for which the standard fine is $250,000, or imprisoned for twenty years, or both. 123
Presumably, this is because the currency or funds involved in § 1956(a) (3)
violations is government money, not proceeds from a specified unlawful activity.
Thus, it would be incongruent for this section to contain language as to the fine being
a certain figure or twice the value of the of the property involved in the transaction. 24
Section 1956(b) provides for violations of § § (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) to also be
liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than the greater of the value
of the property, funds or monetary instruments involved in the transaction, or$10,000.125 The Senate Judiciary Committee intended that such civil penalty under
§ 1956(b) is to be imposed in addition to the fine imposed for the criminal offense."
The forcoming paragraph clearly expresses the Senate Judiciary Committee is
clearly expressed its intent that double monetary penalties should be assessed for
violations of § 1956:
Thus, a person who violates Section 1956 by laundering $250,000
might have the funds civilly forfeited, be subject to a fine of another
$250,000 if convicted of the criminal offense, and pay a civil penalty of
another $250,000 for payment of the criminal fine and civil penalty, the
18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1956(a)(1), (a)(2) (1990).
123 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (3) (1990). See also 18 U.S.C. Section 3623 (1990). This section describes a fine
of $250,000 for Title 18 violations.
124 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a) (3) (1990).
12518 U.S.C.S. § 1956(b) (1990). Section (b) states: "Whoever conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction
described in Subsection (a) (1), on a transportation described in Subsection (a) (2), is liable to the United
States for a civil penalty of not more than the greater of 1) the value of the property, fund, or monetary
instruments involved in the transaction; or 2) $10,000." It should be noted that although "or transportation"
does not follow "transaction" in subparagraph (1) as it does in subsection (b), fines should still be able to
be imposed relating to the property, etc., involved in subsection 1956(a) (2) international transportation
violations and should not be limited to a maximum of a $10,000 fine.
126 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 12.
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government may look to other assets of the defendant not involved in
the offense. 27
Therefore, the time honored plea for mitigation of fines to be assessed against
the defendant at sentencing, based upon the theory that the Internal Revenue Service
will sufficiently punish the defendant through assessment of civil tax, fines, and
possibly jeopardy assessment, should not hold true for the defendant, since Congress
clearly intended to "double whammy" the defendant through the possible assess-
ment of double monetary penalties. Note also that, in addition to the possible
assessment of criminal and civil fines under § 1956, the forfeiture provisions of 18
U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982 may also applied. 28
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Section 1956(0 defines the jurisdiction of acts extraterritorial to the United
States which fall with in the scope of § 1956. The two preconditions for extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction are:
(1) the conduct was committed by a U.S. citizen or, in the case of the
defendant who is not a United States citizen, the conduct must have
occurred in part in the United States, and (2) the transaction or series of
related transactions involves funds or monetary instruments of a value
in excess of $10,000.129
The following excerpt from a Senate report describes the jurisdiction reach
Congress intended for this statute:
Section 1956(f) is intended to clarify the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over
extraterritorial acts that could be constructed to fall with in the scope of
Section 1956. It is not the committee's intention to impose a duty on
foreign citizens operating wholly outside of the United States to become
aware of U.S. laws. Section (f) avoids this by limiting extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the offense to situations in which the interests of the
United States are involved, either because the defendant is a U.S. citi-
zen or because the transaction occurred in whole or in part in the United
States. An example of the latter isa situation in which a person transfers
by wire the proceeds of a drug transaction from a bank in the United
States to a bank in aforeign country; another example is a situation in
which a person telephones instructions from the United States to one
foreign bank to transfer such proceeds to another foreign bank. The
section also specifies that there will only be extraterritorial jurisdiction
27 Id. at 12.
128 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 981 and 982 (1990).
129 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(f) (1990).
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over a transaction or series of related transactions involving more than
$10,000, thus ensuring that Federal extraterritorial jurisdiction is
confined to significant cases."3 (emphasis added)
The Senate made it clearin the foregoing statement that an individual, whether
or not is a U.S. citizen, will be subject to the jurisdiction of § 1956 if he or she
conducts business within the United States.
A question which is not clearly addressed, however, by § 1956(f) and its
legislative history, is whether a foreign financial institution or other foreign entity
is subject to the United States' jurisdiction under this statute if the prescribed
conduct was transacted through such foreign institution. The language of this
section appears broad enough to encompass such situations and subject the foreign
institution to United States jurisdiction if such institutions have sufficient contact
with the United States. However, it is equally apparent that Congress would not have
been so presumptuous as to expect foreign institutions to become aware of the United
States' currency and banking laws as well as its criminal statutes regarding money
laundering.
The bottom line is that the Department of Justice could use the section to
conferjurisdiction of the United States over foreign institutions which participate in
whole or in part in proscribed conduct occurring in the United States. However,
decisions on whether to exercise such jurisdiction would probably be made on a case-
by-case basis, and take into consideration such factors as the nature of the
defendant's contact with the United States, the defendant's role in the underlying
criminal conduct, whether the defendant can be prosecuted in the foreign country and
sufficiency of proof, aggressiveness of the criminal activity, etc. It is certain that the
Department of Justice will use this subsection to prosecute in such situations as it
feels it has a more than adequate case.
Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1956
To date, there have been no reported appellate opinions which analyze § 1956.
Various district courts have held, however, that the statute is constitutional, in that
the term "proceeds" set forth in the statute is not vague, and the language of the
statute provides individuals with adequate notice as to the proscribed conduct
delineated in the statute. 31
In United States v. Kimball 32 the Court ruled that the provisions of
§§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) and (a)(2)(B)(ii) are not unconstitutionally vague despite use of
130 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 14.
t31 United States v. Mainieri, 691 F. Supp 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Mickens, No. 88-CR-309
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
132 United States v. Kimball, 711 F. Supp. 1031 (DC. Nev. 1989).
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the word "avoid" instead of "evade" in the statute, which prohibits the avoidance of
financial transaction reporting requirements (the filing of CTR's). The Court said
that, "avoid" and, "evade" are synonymous. The Court also said the statute relates
specific intent and other elements of a crime in a manner affording law enforcement
personnel sufficient minimal guidelines so as to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
ENGAGING IN MONETARY TRANSACTIONS IN PROPERTY DERIVED
FROM SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIvrrIEs - 18 U.S.C. §1957
Section 1957 creates a new offense which proscribes engaging in monetary
transactions with property which has been derived from a specified unlawful
activity. Section 1957(a)(1) contains the actual prohibition, which states:
Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), know-
ingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in crimi-
nally derived property that is a value greater than $10,000 and is derived
from specified unlawful activity. 133
The elements of § 1957(a)(1) are: (1) an individual must "knowingly engage
in or attempt to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property,
which at some point involves a financial institution as defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5312
and CFR 103.11; (2) the value of the property involved in the transaction must be
greater than $10,000; and (3) the property must, in fact, be proven to be derived from
a specified unlawful activity.3
Analysis of§ 1957 requires reference to its subsection (f). Section 1957(13(1)
defines the term "monetary transaction" as a deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or
exchange, of "funds" or "monetary instrument" by, through, or to a financial
institution which affects interstate of foreign commerce.'1" The term financial in-
stitution is to be defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5312 and 31 CFR 103.11. Section 5312 and
its interpretive regulations give the term "financial institution a broad definition,
which is specifically intended to encompass individuals acting in certain currency
transactions. 36
13 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) (1990).
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957 (a) and (1) (1990).
135 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(f)(1) (1990). This subsection defines monetary transaction as:
(1) the term, "monetary transaction" means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange,
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetaryinstrument (as de-
fined in § 1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a finicial institution (as defined in
§ 5312 of title 31), but such term does not includ any transaction necessary to preserve a
person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution;
136 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(f)(1) (1990). See also 31 U.S.C.S. § 5312(a)(2) (1990) and 31 C.F.R. 103.11 (1989).§ 5312 in conjunction with its regulations defines a financial institution very broadly. For example a person
who engaged in transferring currency between a foreign country and the United States was found to be a
"financial institution under § 5312 and C.F.R. 103.11, since the statute, regulation and the legislative history
make it clear that a single individual conducting activities may be deemed a "financial institution", even
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"Interstate and foreign commerce or transactions affecting interstate or
foreign commerce" is given the same wide ranging definition as discussed under 18
U.S.C. § 1956.137
Section 1957(f)(1) defines "monetary instrument" as having the same mean-
ing given in by § 1956(c)(5) Section 1956(c)(5) defines "monetary instruments" as
coin or currency of the United States or any other country, Traveler's, personal, or
bank checks, money orders, securities in bearer form, and negotiable instruments in
bearer or other form. 13 Section 1957(f)(2) defines the term "criminally derived
property" as "any property constituting or derived from, proceeds obtained from a
criminal offense." 13
The legislative history does not define what is meant by the term "criminally
derived property," other than its definition in § 1957(f)(2). The definition in
§ 1957(f)(2) does not appear to require that the funds be derived from any particular
kind of crime, or indeed, that the funds be derived from a felony or misdemeanor.
The only requirement is that it be property or proceeds from a "criminal offense."' ' 11
Does this mean that a person who skims cash receipts from his business or materially
overstates his deductions, thereby committing tax evasion or subscribing to a false
tax return, can be convicted under this statute if conducts the transaction with
proceeds he skimmed from his business, so long as it is greater than $10,000? Is tax
evasion a "criminal offense" as envisioned by Congress? One could argue that tax
crimes do not fit the contemplated criminal offense since tax crimes do not have, as
a general rule, any identifiable proceeds. In addition, the statute requires that the
proceeds of the transaction which must be greater than $10,000 be derived from a
"specified unlawful activity."
Section 1957(f)(3) defines the term "specified unlawful activity" as having the
same meaning as given in Section 1956(c)(7). 4' Basically, specified unlawful
activities are defined by subsection (c)(7) as: (1) any RICO predicate offense as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), except Title 31 currency transaction reporting
offenses; (2) foreign narcotics violations; (3) any continuing criminal enterprise
offenses (C.C.E., as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848); and (4) the laundry list of offenses
under § 1956(c)(7)(d). In all of four of these definitions, tax crimes are not
though the transactions were not with commercial banks, thus defendant was not entitled to the non-bank
exemption for financial institutions in filing currency transaction reports (CTR's) for cash transactions she
handled in excess of $10,000. United States v. Mouzin, 785 F. 2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United States
v. Hawley, 855 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1988).
137 18 U.S.C.S. § 1952 (1990). See supra Section III, Part A, on interstate and foreign commerce. See also
supra notes 36-38.
13 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(0(1) (1990). See supra Section III, Part A, regarding monetary instruments.
139 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(0(2) (1990).
14 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(0(2) (1990). Compare with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) which requires "some unlawful
activity."
141 8 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(7) and 1957(0(3) (1990). See supra Section III, Part A, specifically footnote 45
which details the exact language of Subsection 1956(c)(7).
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enumerated. In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically prohibited the
application of these money laundering statutes to, as it stated, the "run of the mill"
tax evasion by inflation or deductions or skimming or legitimate income. 142 There-
fore, a person could not be convicted under § 1957 for a transaction which exceeded
$10,000 where property involved in the transaction was derived from proceeds
skimmed from a legitimate activity.
The knowledge requirement contained in § 1957(a)(1) is only that the individ-
ual know that the money involved in the transaction exceeding $10,000 is derived
from some kind of criminal activity. There is no requirement of knowledge that the
funds are derived from any particular kind of crime or, indeed, that the funds were
derived from a felony rather than a misdemeanor. In fact, § 1957(c) states that, "in
a prosecution for an offense under this section, the government is not required to
prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived
property was derived was a specified unlawful activity." 43
Although there is a requirement under § 1957(a) that the government prove the
money orfunds involved in the transaction exceeding $10,000 came from a specified
unlawful activity, this is not a knowledge requirement on the part of the defendant,
but an evidentiary burden on the government.'" In short, § 1957(a) effectively
proscribes any knowing receipt of criminally derived funds or monies when the
amount of those funds involved exceeds $10,000 and a financial institution (as it is
defined broadly defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5312 and 31 CFR 103.11) is utilized at some
point. The statue does not require that these funds be used for any additional criminal
purpose, as does § 1956.
A comparison of the two money laundering statutes reveals that the difference
between §§ 1956 and 1957 are:
1) Section 1956 does not require for a conviction any threshold
dollar amount of the transaction, whereas § 1957 does require the
transaction to be in excess of $10,000.145
2) The knowledge requirement of the defendant that he knew that
the proceeds involved in the transaction are criminally derived under §
1957 is less than the standard under § 1956 which requires that the
defendant know proceeds were derived from some form of unlawful
activity. This is due to the fact that" some unlawful activity" is defined
as being any felony under State or Federal law, whereas "criminally
142 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(7) (1990). See also S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 12.
143 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(c) (1990).
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) and (c) (1990).
141 8 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) (1990). This section should be compared to 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a), (1), (2), or (3)
(1990).
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derived property" can include any particular kind of crime or misde-
meanor. '
3) Section 1956 requires that the defendant intend or attempt that
the funds be used for an additional criminal purpose whereas under §
1957 there is no such requirement that the funds involved in the
transaction be used for any additional criminal purpose. The one over-
riding similarity between § 1956 and 1957 is that the government must
prove that the funds involved in the transaction are derived from a speci-
fied unlawful activity. 147
An example of the operation of § 1957 would be the deposit in a bank of the
proceeds of a house sale by a seller (or the deposit by a real estate agent of his
commission, which exceeds $10,000) who knows that these proceeds were funds
derived from narcotics trafficking. Such a transaction would constitute a violation
of § 1957. It should be noted that the facts of this example are sufficient for a
conviction under § 1957, but the facts are not sufficient to sustain a conviction under
§ 1956. This is because under § 1957 it is not necessary to show the funds be used
for an additional criminal purpose, whereas under § 1956 it is required to show
additional criminal purpose or attempted additional criminal purpose. '
The legislative history shows that it was the intent of Congress that this statute
by used to proscribe the criminal's purchase of large ticket luxury items, thereby
keeping the criminal from enjoying his ill gotten gains. Although this was one of
the intentions of this statute, the following discussion as to the requisite knowledge
of a person who is guilty under these statutes was included in the House Judiciary
Committee Report as a guide to the types of offenses and offenders Congress con-
templated in passing these money laundering statutes, and to emphasize that it was
the intent of Congress to ensure that any individual who knowingly conducts
financial transactions (not just large luxury items) with the proceeds from an illegal
activity may be subject to prosecution under these statutes. The excerpt is as follows:
The comer grocer in a small community is aware of the reputation of a
person who is the local drug trafficker. That person comes to the store
and buys five pounds of hamburger. The grocer takes the cash and de-
posits it in his/her bank account with his/her other receipts. The
financial transaction is the act of the grocer depositing his day's receipts
in his/her bank account. The question is whether the grocer is guilty of
violating this branch of the offense. As Mr. McCollum observed, "You
[the grocer] have to know what he is coming in to buy groceries with is
indeed the money derived from the particular designated crimes; and to
14618 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) and (0(2) compared with 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a), (1), (2), or (3) (Law. Co-op 1990).
147 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) compared with 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a), (1), (2), or (3) (Law. Co-op 1990).
148 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a), (1), (2), or (3) and 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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get to that point, you would have to prove to a jury [that the grocer knew
that] the fellow had no other source of income or that [if] he had-- the
grocer had some more direct knowledge this fellow was just standing
outside on that street comer before he came in peddling drugs, like if [the
grocer] saw him doing it. [Under those circumstances] I don't have any
problem whatsoever holding the grocer accountable if he sees the guy
[the trafficker] outside dealing in drugs and takes cash and walks into
his store....
Mr. Lungren, in reiterating the importance of this branch of the offense
said, "It is time for us to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, 'If
you know that person is a trafficker and has this income derived from
the offense, you better beware of dealing with that person."' 149
It is obvious that the key aspect in determining the viability of an indictment
of an individual for prosecution under § 1957 is the knowledge of the individual as
to the proceeds involved in the transaction. If the evidence is substantial that an
individual knowingly engaged in a transaction with proceeds he knew to be crimi-
nally derived, and if the government can prove the proceeds involved in the
transaction came from a specified unlawful activity, then an indictment is certainly
warranted.
The penalty for violation of § 1957 is a maximum often years imprisonment
and/or a fine as provided for under Title 18 of the United States Code, or an
alternative fine that may be imposed by the court, of not more than twice the amount
of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction.'5 The language of
§ 1957 (b)(1) states, "the punishment for an offense under this subsection is a fine
under Title 18 of the United States Code," referring to 18 U.S.C.S. § 3623 and the
$250,000 fine imposed thereunder. 151
Jurisdiction over a § 1957 offense is based upon the offense taking place in the
United States or the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Jurisdiction over § 1957 offenses also extends to offenses occurring outside the
United States if the defendant is a United States person as defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3077, except for those persons who are employees or contractors of the United
States, regardless of nationality, who are victims or intended victims of an act of ter-
rorism by Yirtue of their employment with the United States.152 Although § 1957 has
a broader extraterritorial reach than does § 1956, there is no explanation for this in
any of either statute's legislative history.
'4' H. R. REP. No. 855, supra note 7, at 13-14.
ISO 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957 (b)(1), (2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
18 U.S.C.S. § 3623 (Law. Co-op 1990).
18 U.S.C.S. § 3077 (Law. Co-op 1990).
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In 1988, § 1957 was amended to provide that the term "monetary transaction",
as defined by § 1957(f)(1), was not to include certain transactions between a
defendant and his attorney.5 3 Specifically, the amendment reads, "but such term
[monetary transaction] does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a
persons right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution.' Although the intricacies and breadth of the issues raised by § 1957
and this amendment's impact upon defendants' right to representation and the
attorney-client privilege are beyond the scope of this article, a few comments are
warranted. During the legislative history of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, the House Judiciary Conimittee and subsequently the House version of the
money laundering bill adopted a resolution limiting § § 1956 and 1957 to exclude fi-
nancial transactions involving bona fide attorneys fees accepted by an attorney for
representing a client in a criminal investigation.155 The discussion of the provision
was included in the section on knowledge, presumably the Committee's intention
was that such a provision would apply to violations of both §§ 1956 and 1957.
However, the provision was not followed by the Senate, and was not made part of
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.156
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, however, amended § 1957(f)(1) to include
the present provision cited above. 57 Itis interesting to note that the 1988 amendment
was included only in § 1957 and was not also included in section 1956. A possible
explanation for this is that § 1956 requires the transaction which includes the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity to be for bad purpose. To include an
I" Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, Title VI, Subtitle E, § 6182 (1988).
13 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(f) (1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
'5 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 7, at 14. The language of the Subcommittee on Crime of H.R. 5077, Mon-
eylaundering Control Act of 1986, July 16, 1986, was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee. The
Subcommittee's discussion was as follows:
The Subcommittee adopted an amendment limiting this offense in one very important
regard:
This paragraph does not apply to financial transactions involving the bona fide fees an
attorney accepts for representing a client in a criminal investigation or any proceeding
arising therefrom.
The Subcommittee was aware of a potential impact upon the exercise of the sixth
amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in the event of application of
this offense to bona fide fees received by attorneys. An attorney representing a person
facing criminal investigation or prosecution, in order to carry out the professional
obligation to fully represent their clients, must inquire into many aspects of a client's
personal lives and financial circumstances and thus may learn that part of the fee with
which the attorney has been paid was derived from a designated offense. The Sub-
committee was very concerned that, in the absence of this provision, the potential for
such discovery might have had the effect of inhibiting the attorney's complete
investigation of the client's case (to avoid learning any information which could have
triggered this offense) and would thus have interferred with the client's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
156 Id. at 14.
137 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957() (1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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exemption for bona fide attorney fees in § 1956 would thus be incongruent with the
statute's purpose of criminalizing bad purpose transactions conducted with dirty
money, for payment of one's attorney, even with illegally derived proceeds, is not
a transaction with an inherent bad purpose. Since § 1957 does not require the
transaction with proceeds from a specified unlawful activity to be for a bad purpose,
the provision was included within its language. It should be noted that although
§ 1957 now provides that the term "monetary" transaction does not include any
transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it does not exempt all other
non-bona fide attorney fee payments or transactions between the defendant and his
attorney. The legislative history of the provision makes very clear that the statue
only exempts transactions between a defendant and his attorney which relate to the
defendant's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Al-
though not stated explicitly in the exemption contained in § 1957(f)(1), such exemp-
tion would presumably not only apply to the defendant, but also to his counsel.
Upon a reading of the House Judiciary Committees's discussion of this
exemption, this conclusion becomes fairly evident. The discussion provides:
The Subcommittee adopted an amendment limiting this offense in one
very important regard:
This paragraph does not apply to financial transactions involving the
bona fide fees an attorney accepts for representing a client in a criminal
investigation or any proceeding arising therefrom.
This Sub committee was aware of a potential impact upon the exercise
of the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in the
event of application of this offense to bona fide fees received by
attorneys. An attorney representing a person facing criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution, in order to carry out the professional obligation to
fully represent their clients, must inquire into many aspects of a client's
personal lives and financial circumstances and thus may learn that part
of the fee with which the attorney has been paid was derived from a
designated offense. The Subcommittee was very concerned that, in the
absence of this provision, the potential for such discovery might have
had the effect of inhibiting the attorney's complete investigation of the
client's case (to avoid learning any information which could have
triggered this offense) and would thus have interfered with the client's
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
It would follow that this exemption also precludes the forfeiture of such fees
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981.158
"s Hearings, 100th Cong., 1 st Sess. 18-19 (1987) (testimony of William F. Weld, Asst. Atty. Gen. Criminal,
Div.). The statement of William F. Weld as to the attorney-client exemption under § 1957 states:
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The constitutionality of § 1957 may be argued by some defendants to be
questionable, due to the lack of an "intent element." That is, there is no required
intent that the transaction be for a "bad purpose", only that the defendant intend to
enter into the transaction (any legal transaction greater than $10,000 should suffice
as long as it, at some point, involves a financial institution) with proceeds he knows
are from a "criminal activity," and which are in reality from a specified unlawful
activity. However, to date there are no reported appellate decisions which analyze
§ 1957, and few district court cases which even address § 1957.
In conclusion, § 1957 allows the government to convict an individual who
conducts any transaction which at some point involves a financial institution, and
the amount of which exceeds $10,000, when the individual knows the proceeds
involved in the transaction are from some criminal activity, and the government can
show the criminal activity from which the proceeds are derived in a specified
unlawful activity. Since the government does not have to show a "bad purpose"
behind the transaction, this statute has the potential to be the basis of a favorite charge
of the government. Not only can this statute be easily applied to the principals of
illegal organizations, but it also applies to those who assist the principals, i.e.
professional money launders and "smurfs," along with anyone who knowingly
handles illegally derived proceeds in amounts over $10,000 which the government
can show came from specified unlawful activity.
This statute should be particularly useful, as intended, in reaching the
criminals who use their ill gotten gains in purchasing the large ticket items of which
they are so fond. Note how the application of this statute works a double whammy
upon the criminal in these transactions. First, he may run afoul of § 1957 in his
purchase of a luxury item, thereby facing a ten year felony in addition to a substantial
While there is no statutory prohibition upon the applicaion of § 1957 to transactions
involving bona fide fees paid to attorney for representation in a criminal matter, the
Department recognizes that attorneys in such situations, unlike others who may deal with
criminal wrongdoers, may be required to investigate and pursue matters which will provide
them with kinowledge of the illicit source fo the property they receive. Indeed, the failure
to investigate such matters may be a breach of ethical standards or may result in a lack of
effective assistance of counsel to the client.
Because the Department firmly believes that attorneys representing clients in criminal
matters must not be hampered in their ability to effectively and ethically represent their
clients within the bounds of the law, it is the proposed policy of the Department that
prosecutions under § 1957 will not be brought against attorneys based upon the receipt of
property constituting bona fide fees fer the legitimate representation in a criminal matter,
except if there is actual knowledge of the illegal origin of the specific property received and
such evidence does not consist of confidential communications or other information
obtained by the attorney during the representation and in furtherance of the obligation to
effectively represent the client.
This proposed prosecution standard applies only to fees for legal services actually rendered
in a criminal matter. Attorneys who engage in other commercial transactions unrelated to
the representation of a client in a criminal matter or who represent clients in civil matters
should be treated as any other.
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fine of a maximum of $250,000 or twice the amount of the property involved, and
he may also lose the beloved large ticket item he just purchased through the forfeiture
provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 or 982, discussed infra.
THE FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
CoNTROL AcT OF 1986
Section 1366 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 added a new
Chapter 46 to Title 18 of the United States Code. This new chapter authorizes the
government to make both civil and criminal forfeitures relating to, but not necessar-
ily involving traditional money laundering. The new provisions consist of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 981 and 982. Section 981 prescribes the civil forfeitures and Section 982
prescribes the criminal forfeitures.
Civil Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981: An analysis of the Statute
Its Provisions, and Procedures for Forfeiture
Section 981 (a)(1), as originally passed by the Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986 described three types of property forfeitable to the Federal government. 59
Section 98 1(a)(1)(A) made forfeitable any real or personal property that represents
the gross receipts of a person obtained either directly or indirectly as a result of a
violation of §§ 1956 or 1957, or which are traceable to such violations. The term
"gross receipts" was specifically intended by Congress and enunciated by the Senate
Judiciary Committee to mean that only the commission earned by the money
launderer is subject to forfeiture and not the corpus or proceeds itself which is
laundered. 0 Although a stepin the right direction, § 981 (a)(1)(A) was very limited,
allowing the government to forfeit only the money launderer's commission. It could
not touch the illegal proceeds of the criminal which were derived from the specified
unlawful activity, as defined by § 1956(c)(7).16 1
For example, X, a drug dealer buys a $500,000 home through a real estate
agent with proceeds X has derived from his narcotics trafficking. The real estate
agent who is to make a $50,000 commission on the sale of the home knows the
money X is using to buy the home is illegally derived income, in fact, the home is
put in X's mother's name to conceal true ownership and source of funds. Under this
example only the commission of the real estate agent could be seized and X gets to
keep his home. In fact, this situation is not totally in line with the heart and soul of
the substantive statutes, §§ 1956 and 1957 which are aimed at both the principal
criminal himself and those who assist him in carrying on his illegal activity and to
159 The three types are real property, personal property, and coin or currency. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 981 (a)(1)(A)
and (C) (Law. Co-op 1987).
160 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 23.
161 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c) (7) (1990). See supra Section III, Part A, for the definition of a specified unlawful
activity.
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prevent the criminal himself from enjoying the fruits of his criminal labors.
On November 18,1988, with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Congress amended the language of § 981 (a)(1)(A) and deleted § 981 (a)(1)(C) as it
was originally written. 1 Prior to the November 18, 1988, amendment, § 981(a)(1)(C)
provided that the government could force forfeiture of property in relation to:
Any coin and currency (or other monetary instrument as the Secretary
of the Treasury may prescribe) or any interest in other property,
including any deposit in a financial institution, traceable to such coin or
currency involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation
of section 5313(a) or 5324 of title 31 may be seized and forfeited to the
United States Government. No property or interest in property shall be
seized or forfeited if the violation is by a domestic financial institution
examined by a Federal bank supervisory agency or a financial institu-
tion regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a partner,
director, officer, or employee thereof.
Section 981(a)(1)(C) as initially promulgated did not contain the limiting
Language of "gross receipts" as did § 981(a)(1)(A). Therefore the government
could, under § 981(a)(1)(C), forfeit the entire amounts involved in or traceable to
violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 or 5324.16 Under § 981(a)(1)(C), if an individual
structures $100,000 of cashinto a bank account in violating 31 U.S.C. Section 5324,
then uses this money to buy a house for $100,000, the house is forfeitable under
§ 981 (a)(1)(C), because the purchase of the house is traceable to the currency which
was involved in the transactions which violated § 5324. Note also that if the
individual left the $100,000 in the bank account after the structured transactions, the
entire $100,000 of currency could also be seized.
What Congress did in amending §§ 981(a)(1)(C) in November of 1988 was
to effectively combine the best parts of both subsections while dropping the "gross
receipts" limitation of subsection (a)(1XA). The result was an amended § 981(a)(1)(A)
which provides that:
"Any property, real or personal, involved in or traceable to viola-
tions of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1956 or 1957, or Title 31 U.S.C.
Sections 5313 (a) or 5324."165
16 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 75, Title VI, Subtitle N, § 6463(a) (civil forfeiture) and
6463(c) (criminal forfeiture). These sections amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 982 to their respective
language as it appears today.
" 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a) (1) (c) (Law. Co-op 1987).
164 31 U.S.C.S. § 5313 and 5324 (Law. Co-op 1990). See supra Section III, Part A, as to the relation of
§§ 5313 and 5324 with 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1)(ii).
M 18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (a)(l)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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This language allows the government to civilly force forfeiture of any
property, real or personal, which the government can show, was involved in or
traceable to a transaction, where the proceeds of that transaction were derived from
a specified unlawful activity (as required by §§ 1956 and 1957), and the transaction
was for a bad purpose (§ 1956) or for greater than $10,000 (§ 1957), or the property
was involved in a transaction which violated the CRT requirements under 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5313(a) or 5324. The legislative history of the amendment to § 981 contained in
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 makes it very clear that the phrase
"property"... involved in.. ." includes all facilitating property as well as pro-
ceeds.16 This provision may become useful to the government in forcing forfeiture
of assets used in violation of many of the white collar criminal activities which
heretofore have escaped forfeiture.
Section 981(a)(1)(B) provides that the government may civilly force forfei-
ture of property in the United States that represents the proceeds of a violation of a
foreign drug law. The offense must also be a felony drug violation under United
States law if such offense would have occurred within the jurisdiction of the United
States. This provision will allow the government to forfeit the proceeds of a foreign
drug violation and any property derived from the activity. However, the provision
does not authorize the United States to forfeit property that was used or intended to
be used in the violation of the foreign drug law, which differs from 21 U.S.C.§ 881.167
Section 98 1(a) (1) (C) provides for the forfeiture of any property traceable, real
or personal, which represents the proceeds of or is derived from the proceeds
traceable to various violations involving individuals and financial institutions, such
as 18 U.S.C. § 215 (commissions or gifts for procuring loans), § 656 (relating to
theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank employees), § 657 (relating to
leading, credit, and insurance institutions), and §§ 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, and
1344. Note, again, however that this section does not authorize forfeiture of property
used or intended to be used commission of the violations. 68
Section 981(b) provides that property subject to forfeiture under §§ 981(a)(1)(A)
through 981 (a)(1)(C) may be seized by the Attorney General. In a situation in which
property is involved in violations of §§ 1956 and 1957 or 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) or
5324, and such violations are being investigated by the Secretary of the Treasury,
then such property may be seized by the Secretary of the Treasury.169 Section 981(j)
provides that this forfeiture authority vested in the Attorney General and Secretary
of the Treasury may be delegated by them to the proper parties. 7 '
16 Hearings, supra note 169, at 18-19 (testimony of William F. Weld).
167 21 U.S.C.S. § 881 (Law. Co-op 1990).
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a)(1)(C) (Law. Co-op 1990).
169 18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (a)(1)(C) (Law. Co-op 1990).
170 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(j) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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Section 981(b) also indicates when property is subject to forfeiture, the
procedure for forfeiture, when the property may be taken with or with out process,
and the appropriate measures which must be taken. 17 1 For property to be seized
without process, § 981(b)(2) follows the recent amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 881,
which allow the government to request the issuance of a seizure warrant authorizing
it to seize the property subject to forfeiture pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 172 Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
specific procedures for obtaining search and seizure warrants. Subsection (c) of Fed.
R. Crim. p. 41 states that the threshold level for the granting of a seizure warrant is
a finding of probable cause.1 73 The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that:
The procedural aspects of seizures and forfeitures under this section are
to be governed by the procedures for civil forfeitures under the Customs
law, as now employed under our drug laws (see 21 U.S.C. 88 1(d)), in
order that forfeitable property may be seized or a probable cause basis
prior to entry of the order of forfeiture. 74
Although a discussion of probable cause is beyond the scope of this analysis
it suffices to note that probable cause has been defined as, ... "those facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable cautious and prudent man to be-
lieve..." that such property is subject to seizure according to law. 7 1
The other method set forth in § 981(b) in which the government can force
forfeiture of property without process is obviously when the seizure is pursuant to
a lawful arrest or search.176
The process by which property may be forfeited with process is defined in
§§ 981(b) and 981(d). The forfeitures with process are to be governed by the
procedures for civil forfeitures under the Customs law, specifically, pursuant to the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. 77 However the
thrust of this article will deal with those forfeitures executed by the government
without notice, specifically those pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for this is the provision which will most likely have the most profound
171 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b) (Law. Co-op 1990).
'7 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b), (1), (2) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(b) (Law. Co-op 1990). This
Subsection's proceedures for forfeiture were virtually copied word for word into 18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (b). Note
that both provisions are included in Subsection (b) or their respecting statutes. The only changes made were
those provisions relating to narcotics in 881(b) which obiviously do not apply to 981(b).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.
174 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 24.
'75 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
176 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
'" 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b), (d) (Law. Co-op 1990). 19 U.S.C.S. § 1602 et. seq. (1990) provisions of the
Customs laws relating to the seizure, summary, and judicial forfeiture condemnation and disposition of
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effect in combating domestic criminal activity.
Section 981(a)(2) sets forth an "innocent owner" exception to property which
is forfeitable under § 98 1(a)(1). Other Federal forfeiture statutes already contain
similar provisions, especially 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (7), explicitly including
lienholders under their protections.'78 The "innocent owner" exception has been
judicially developed by the courts especially in regard to 21 U.S.C. § 881, of which
§ 981 is essentially a carbon copy. The courts have defined the "innocent owner"
to include the following elements: (1) the individual must have a valid good faith
interest in the seized property as the true owner, not just a nominee (who has
"dominion and control" is often the issue in regard to this element); (2) the contesting
party must not have had any knowledge of the asset being used or to be used in any
illegal activity; (3) the alleged owner must not have knowledge of the particular
violation in which the asset was used which subjects the asset to forfeiture; (4) the
individual must have no knowledge that the user of the asset had previously been
involved in criminal activity, especially the type which subjects the property to
forfeiture; and (5) the petitioner must have taken all reasonable steps to prevent
illegal use of the property. 79
In addition to the innocent owner and lien holder provisions, § 981(a)(1)
provides that:
No property shall be seized or forfeited in the case of violations of
§ 5313(a) of Title 31 by a domestic financial institution examined by a
Federal bank supervisory agency or a financial institution regulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission or a partner, director, or
employer thereof.18 °
178 177. 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
'- 21 U.S.C.S. § 881 (Law. Co-op 1990). For discussion of the innocent owner rule, see United States v.
One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 584 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1978) (Discussing situations of innocent
owner defense such as property taken without privity or consent, where the owner was uninvolved or
unaware of the wrongful activity and had done all that could be reasonably expected to prevent the pro-
scrubed use of property); United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Airlift, 647 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1143 (1981), (persons contesting forfeiture of an asset must first show
ownershop of the assit before they can plead innocent owner rule). For discussion of ownership interest,
see United States v. One 1979, Datson 280 ZX, 720 F.2d 543, (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1971
Porsche Coupe Auto, 364 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1973). As to unlawful possession of unconsented use, see,
United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, 453 F. Supp. 639 (D. Colo. 1978), United States v. One 1978
Chrysler Lebaron Station Wagon, 531 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. N.Y. 1981), United States v. Four Million Two
Hundred and Fifth Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars and Thirty Nine Cent, 551 F. Supp. 314
(S.D. Fla. 1983). See also United States v. One 1980 BMW, 559 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. N.Y. 1983) (lack of
awareness is not sufficient when owner has notice of persons involvement in drug trafficking), United States
v. One piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (since forfeiture actually occurs at moment
of illegal use, no third party can acquire legally recognezable interest in property after the activity which
subjects it to forfeiture, for to hold otherwise would diminish the Governments interest at expense of
lienhold and it would be contrary to the relation back doctrine, which says interest in the property vests in
the Government at time of illegal act). For a discussion of what an innocent owner must show to prevail,
see United States v. One (1) 1980 Stapleton Pleasure Vessel, etc, 575 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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It is interesting to note that Congress did not include violations of §§ 1956 or
1957 within the exception prohibiting forfeitures for violations of 31 U.S.C.
§ § 5313(a) or 5324 when certain regulated banks or brokerage firms are involved in
the violation. Presumably then, if such institutions are involved in violations of
§§ 1956 or 1957, the forfeiture provisions of § 981 can be utilized. Even in cases
where such regulated banks and brokerage firms are involved in violations of
§§ 1956 or 1957, the government will presumably use great discretion prior to ex-
ercising its forfeiture power under § 981, due to the inherent myriad problems
involved in such forfeitures and the interests of otherwise innocent depositors and
investors. However, § 981 may be used against assets of a partner, director, or
employee of such entities which was involved in or traceable to such violations.18"'
Sections 981 (c) and 981 (d) relate to the custody and disposition of forfeited
property, respectively, and, as previously stated, § 981(d) notes that the Customs
laws are specifically incorporated by this section. Section 981(e) authorizes, and
under certain conditions, the Attorney General or Secretary of the Treasury to
transfer forfeited property to any other Federal agency, or to any State or local law
enforcement agencies by the Attorney General or Secretary of the Treasury are not
reviewable. The statute also authorizes the Attorney General or Secretary of the
Treasury, upon certain conditions, to discontinue the forfeiture proceedings in favor
of State of local proceedings.18 2 Such property transfers are to be utilized solely by
the State and local law enforcement agency participating in such investigations or
seizures. The property may not be used by the State or local entity for any purposes
other than law enforcement. The determination of what property or share of property
may be used is determined by the percentage of the investigation conducted by the
State or local agency.
Section 981 (f) codifies the "relation back doctrine" by stating that all right,
title, and interest in property described in § 98 1(a) shall vest in the United States upon
the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under § 981 83 Sections 981(g)
and 981(h) deal with stays of forfeiture proceedings and venue, respectively. Section
981(g) provides that upon a filing of an indictment or information alleging a
violation of Federal, State, or local law, which is also related to a forfeiture
proceeding under § 981, shall, upon good cause shown, stay the forfeiture proceed-
ing until the criminal action is disposed of. The significance and strategic use of this
provision will be discussed in the following section of this article which discusses
practical applications of the forfeiture provisions under §§ 981 and 982.184 In the
case of property of a defendant charged with a violation that is the basis for forfeiture
of property under § 981, § 98 1(h) allows for venue of a proceeding for forfeiture
action under § 981 to be in the judicial district in which the defendant owning such
"' Id., 981(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990).
18 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(e) (Law. Co-op 1990).
8 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(0 (Law. Co-op 1990).
18 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(g) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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property is found or in the judicial district in which the criminal prosecution is
brought. This is in addition to venue as provided for in U.S.C. § 1395 or any other
provision of law relating to venue. 185
Finally, section 981(i) sets forth additional provisions applicable only to
property subject to forfeiture under violations of foreign drugs laws and equitable
sharing with foreign nations in such situations. These provisions of § 981 will not
be included in this analysis. 8 6
Criminal Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 982: An Analysis of
the Statute, its Provisions and Procedures for Forfeiture
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 created, along with § 981, its
counterpart in § 982. Section 982(a), which sets forth criminal forfeiture provisions,
by provides that a court, "in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense
under Section 1956 or 1957, shall order that person to forfeit to the United States any
property, real or personal, which represents the gross receipts the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as result of such offense, or which is traceable to such gross
receipts." 8 The use of the term "gross receipts," as discussed previously in the
analysis of § 981, was intended by Congress to represent only the commissions
earned by the money launderer in laundering the illegal proceeds for another criminal
or his criminal enterprise. As would be expected, the definition of "gross receipts"
in this statute, as in § 981, greatly limited the scope of forfeitable property under this
statute, and, therefore the effectiveness of this statue. Moreover, there was no "sub-
stitution asset" provision as under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Consequently, § 982 was never
used prior to its amendment by the Anti-Drug Act of 1988.
Section 6463(c) of the Act deleted the entire language of § 982(a) described
previously, and replaced it with a new subection (a), which provides that:
The court, in imposing sentence of a person convicted of an offense in
violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 5313(a) or 5324 or 18 U.S.C. Section
1956 or 1957, shall order that person to forfeit to the United States any
property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property
traceable to such property.'88
It should be noted that forfeiture is mandatory upon the defendant's convic-
tion. 189
Section 6463(c) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also created § 982(b),
185 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(h) (Law. Co-op 1990).
186 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(i) (Law. Co-op 1990).
187 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(a) (Law. Co-op 1987).
188 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(a) (Law. Co-op 1987).
89 Id., (The language "Court shall order hearings".)
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which authorizes the criminal forfeiture of "substitute assets." Section 982(b)(1)(A)
provides that property which is subject to forfeiture under § 982(a)(1), or any seizure
disposition or administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such forfeiture,
shall be governed by subsections (c) and (e) through (h) of 21 U.S.C. § 853. The
language of 21 U.S.C. 853(b), incorporated into § 982(b)(1)(A), provides that if any
property otherwise forfeitable under § 982(a)(1), because of any act or omission of
the defendant, either:
a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with a third party;
c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
without difficulty;
the court shall order the forfeiture of any otherproperty of the defendant
up to the value of the otherwise forfeitable property. 19,
This substitution of assets can have great applicability, as will be demon-
strated in the next section, in reaching assets of the defendant who has been convicted
of money laundering under § § 1956 or 1957 or the CTR violations under 31 U.S.C.
§ 5313(a) or 5324. This is especially true when the nature, form, or character of the
illegal proceeds have changed but such assets are still in the defendant's ownership
but under a different but under a different form. However, § 6464(d) of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also created § 982(b)(2) which states that the scope of the
substitution of assets provision of § 982(b)(1)(A) shall not be used to order a
defendant to forfeit assets in place of the actual property laundered where such
defendant acted merely as an intermediary who handled but did not retain the
property in the course of the money laundering offense. 191
This additional language is very puzzling and problematic as applied to the
professional money launderer, as they never retain the money laundered, only a fee
for their services. Indeed, it is the professional money launderers' job to almost
immediately pass the illegal proceeds to their "clients" after its "cleansing" process.
It is hard to believe or to suggest that Congress intended to exempt such professional
money launderers who have grown wealthy "cleansing" the criminal's ill gotten
gains from this "substitute assets" provision. Rather, it would seem more probable
that Congress had in mind the employees ("smurfs") often utilized by the profes-
sional money launderer, when it drafted this exemption. Otherwise, the only person
who may be able to be reached under the substitute assets provision of § 982(b)(1)(A)
is the principal criminal himself, who retains the illegal proceeds after they have been
washed.
18 U.S.C.S. § 982(b)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(b) (Law. Co-op 1990).
191 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(b)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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However, according to this provision's legislative history, it appears a narrow
reading should be given to § 982(b)(2). The legislative history of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 appears to clarify this, in that the substitute assets provision is
to apply to: (1) the principal criminal; (2) a defendant who initially or ultimately had
control of the laundered property and who was not merely an intermediary in the
money laundering transaction; and (3) the professional money launderer, but only
to the extent of the money launderer's fee and any property he or she may have used
to facilitate the offense. The substitute assets provision would not apply to the
money launderer to the extent of the amount of illegal proceeds he might launder.
The Senate discussion goes on to say that if the substitute asset provision would
apply to the professional launder in all cases, it would permit a court to order a person
who violated the money laundering statutes, by converting millions of dollars to
some otherform on behalf of anotherparty, to forfeit substitute assets worth millions
of dollars from the launderer, when in reality he only kept a portion of the illegal
proceeds as his fee. Such would render an unduly harsh result upon the launderer. 192
It should also be noted that § 982(a)(1), like § 981 (a)(1)(A), provides that no
property shall be seized or forfeited in the case of a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a)
by a certain regulated banks and brokerage firms. 193 In addition, § 982(a)(2), like its
counterpart § 98 1(a)(1)(C), provides that an individual convicted of a violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 215,656,657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1341, 1343, or 1344, (various
violations dealing with financial institutions) shall be ordered to forfeit to the United
States any property constituting or derived from, directly or indirectly, such
violation.194 The substitute asset provision, through the language of § 982(b)(1)(B)
incorporating within it the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 853(h), also applies to assets
acquired through the above violations. 95 Both § § 981 and 982 may be useful to the
government in reaching any ill gotten wealth acquired by individuals caught up in
the savings and loan debacle.
Practical Applications of the Money Laundering
and Forfeiture Statutes
The forfeiture provisions of §§ 981 and 982 provide the government with a
powerful tool which heretofore never really existed, except to some degree in the
RICO statutes and narcotics forfeiture statutes.' 96 The former provisions were
limited in that they were substantive RICO charges or restricted to narcotics traffick-
ing. The new forfeiture provisions allow for civil and criminal forfeiture of assets
purchased in transaction utilizing proceeds derived from no only narcotics traffick-
19 134 Cong. Ree. S17365 (1988).
1- 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(a)(1) (Law. Co-op 1990).
M 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
195 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(b)(1)(B) (Law. Co-op 1990).
'- 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1951 through 1955 and 1961 through 1963 (1990). These are the racketeering statutes.
See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 881 (Law. Co-op 1990).
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ing but also the laundry list of racketeering activity defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
and other criminal activity defined in § 1956(c)(7)(D), in addition to violations of
the CTR laws, under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5324.
A good example of the power, and the almost Draconian effect, these
forfeiture statutes can have can be illustrated through the following hypothetical
situation. Let's say Mary Doe is an elderly woman whose husband has died and left
her with a substantial amount of cash in the bank. Mary Doe has heard about the CTR
requirements of § § 5313 and 5324 which require a currency transaction report to be
filed for cash transactions of amounts greater than $10,000 which involved financial
institutions. Mary Doe is along in years, and she wants to give some cash gifts to
her three grandchildren, of $7,000 each. However, Mary, like many law abiding
citizens, is wary of having the bank fill out a form and send it to the government to
report her banking activities. Mary decides to break up her $21,000 cash withdrawal
into three transactions of $7,000 each. So Mary goes to the bank three days in a row,
each day to a different branch, and withdraws $7,000 each day. She then goes to the
financial institution of each of her grandchildren and deposits the cash in an account
in each of their names. None of these individual transactions of Mary Doe required
the bank to file a CTR under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a). However, under 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5324, Mary Doe has violated subsection (3), which provides:
"No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements
of Section 5313(a) with respect to structure or assist in structuring, or
attempt to structure, or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or
more domestic financial institutions. 1
The bank, seeing that Mary has "structured" such transactions, files a CTR for
the transactions and notifies the local IRS Criminal Division office of the suspicious
transaction. '
Based upon this information, the apparent violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 and
the civil forfeiture provisions of § 981 (a)(1), which specifically incorporates viola-
tions of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, these monies deposited by Mary Doe into her grandchil-
drens' accounts are technically subject to the civil forfeiture provision of § 981(a)(1).
i 31 U.S.C.S. § 5324(3) (Law. Co-op 1990).
"'Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, supra note 1, at § 1353. Section 1353 of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 amends the right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (Privacy Act), 12 U.S.C.S. § 3401
(1990) in two respects. One allows the financial institution to notify proper government authorities of
information it has which may be relevant to a possible violation of statute or regulation affecting a financial
institution. Specifically a financial institution can turn over to the Government without notice to the
customer the following information relating to a suspected violation (1) the name or names of the
individuals conducting the suspected transaction and other identifying information pertaining to such in-
dividuals; (2) the account number or other identifiying account information; and (3) the nature of the
suspected illegal activity. The second aspect of the charge has to do with grand jury subpoenas which is not
relevant to this discussion. See also S. Rep. No. 433, supra note 6. at 14-19.
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All the government must do to effectuate a forfeiture under § 981 (a)(1) is to prepare
a forfeiture affidavit and present it to the magistrate showing him a probable cause
basis of a violation of § 5324, which in this situation should be no problem, since
we have a prima facie violation of § 5324.199 The funds to be forfeited, i.e., the
$7,000 in each of the three grandchildrens accounts, are directly traceable to the
violations, putting them squarely within the purview of§ 981 (a). Once the forfeiture
warrant is signed, the government then descends on the three bank accounts of Mary
Doe's grandchildren containing $7.000 each. Instead of making a nice gift to her
three grandchildren, Mary doe has had the gifts seized and forfeited to the govern-
ment, in addition to facing a possible indictment for violation of § 5324. Note that
this example encompasses forfeiture of Mary Doe's previously taxed income, and
the money has no taint of illegal activity (although currency involved in violations
of § § 5313 and 5324 are not required to be from illegal activities).' Obviously this
example is an extreme theoretical case, but it illustrates the technical workings of the
substantive and forfeiture provisions, and the power the forfeiture statutes give the
government to go after assets in a civil forfeiture proceedings when it can show a
probable violation of §§ 1956 or 1957 and §§ 5313 or 5324.
Although these statutes passed by Congress give the government substantial
forfeiture power, it is inconceivable that Congress meant to include such situations
as described in the above hypothetical within the purpose of these forfeiture statutes.
Analysis of the legislative history of these forfeiture statutes do not reveal any
specific policy laid down by Congress to which the application of the forfeiture
statutes were to be subject. However, the legislative history of §§ 981 and 982 does
provided some guideposts. These "guideposts" can be summarized as follows:
1. The hearings and debate which led to the passage of § 981 were
focused on the laundering of monies derived from criminal activi-
ties with the most emphasis on drug violations.
2. The purpose of the addition of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5324
violations to the forfeiture provisions of § 981 was to eliminate the
need for law enforcement to show a connection between the monies
involved in the § § 5313 and 5324 violations and drug trafficking or
other non-drug criminal activity in order to effectuate a forfeiture.
3. Congress also expressed a desire that actions involving amounts of
$25,000 or less be taken sparingly and with good cause. Congress
appreciated the fact that seizure and forfeiture of one's assets is a
drastic measure. It is an area where government agencies, who are
given such authority, may in their zeal to crack down on criminal,
may overstep the fine line of prudence and thereby cause great
hardship to innocent individuals.2 1
.18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b)(2) (1990).
200 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 5313 and 5324 (1990).
201 H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 20-28 (1986).
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With the above "guideposts" in mind, and based upon the procedures laid out
in some detail by Congress in § 981, the following policy or something similar to
it, should probably be followed by the government in effectuating forfeitures
relating to monies involved in violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) or 5324. (Remem-
ber, it is not a requirement under §§ 5313(a) or 5324 that the currency involved in
the transaction be derived from any illegal activity.)M
1. Probable cause, as required by § 981(b), must first be developed,
showing that the monies to be forfeited have been involved in
violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) or 5324. (If at all possible, facts
should be presented which shed light on the fact that monies may be
untaxed, i.e., by seeing if such amounts are commensurate with the
individual transactor's income and lifestyle, or if the proceeds may
have the taint of illegal income.)
2. An affidavit of forfeiture prepared in preparation of a seizure
warrant to be obtained in compliance with the proper rules of crimi-
nal procedure, i.e., presentation of affidavit in support of the seizure
warrant to a federal magistrate. 2 3 Upon approval of the seizure
warrant the property should be seized.
It should be noted that § 98 1(b) specifically grants the Attorney General or
Secretary of the Treasury to authorize forfeitures of property involved in violation
of §§ 5313(a) or 5324 or §§ 1956 or 1957.1 Section 9810) allows the Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury to delegate such authority.2 5 What this means
in practical terms is that Federal agents of such agencies as the FBI, IRS, DEA, and
Customs Service, in concert with the Attorney General or controlled by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, are through the procedures of § 981, can "administratively"
forfeit property involved in the above mentioned statutes. Although administrative
and judicial forfeitures are beyond the scope of this analysis, it should suffice to say
that administrative forfeitures are those that are handled entirely by the executive
agency, in compliance with the agencies own administrative guidelines, until the
time the individual from whom the property has been seized does such an act, as
prescribed by the agencies' guidelines, which converts the forfeiture into a judicial
proceeding. This act is a usually accomplished by the forfeiter filing a claim and cost
bond of a prescribed amount with the seizing agency, thereby, causing the Attorney
Generals office to file a complaint in Federal district court against the seized
property.
The following steps are in additionto the two previously set forth, which relate
to administrative forfeitures and the steps which should be adopted to properly and
2- 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 5313(a); 5324 (Law. Co-op 1990).2 Fed. R. Crim. P.41.
20 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b) (Law. Co-op 1990).
205 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(j) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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fairly effectuate a forfeiture case, once the Federal Magistrate has authorized the
seizure warrant:
3. If, after seizure, there is a continued reasonable belief that the
property seized were derived from non-taxed or criminal activity,
forfeiture proceedings should be instituted either administratively
or judicially, depending upon the facts and circumstances and as
provided by § 981 (b).1 (This step will obviously overlap with step
1.)
4. If it becomes known through various investigative means or as
represented by a reasonable non-self serving explanation by the
individual from whom the property was seized that the property is
not derived from criminal activity or that such property, although
not criminally derived has been previously taxed, the property
should be returned to the individual.
5. If the individual(s) from whom the property was seized is unable to
articulate that the property was derived from a legitimate source or
if he refuses to make a complete and truthful disclosure of all the
facts relating to the property, then there is a reasonable belief that the
property came from nontaxable sources or criminal activity and for-
feiture proceedings should be continued. Again, it should be noted
that at any time the person from whom the property was seized can
do those things which are necessary (usually by filing a claim and
cost bond) to make the forfeiture a judicial action to be heard in a
federal district court.
The above policy is more restrictive on the government agencies empowered
to effectuate such forfeitures than what can be gleaned by a literal reading of § 981.
However, those Federal agencies empowered to effectuate forfeitures under the
statute would do well to follow such a prudential policy, so as not to "kill the goose
which laid the golden egg", so to speak, and turn public sentiment against such for-
feitures, so as to force Congress to repeal the measure.
It should be noted that such policy should only apply to forfeitures relating to
§ § 5313(a) and 5324 and not to forfeitures under § § 1956 and 1957. This is because,
as stated previously, there is no requirement under §§ 5313(a) and 5324 that the prop-
erty involved in such violation be derived from some illegal source; whereas, for
violations of §§ 1956 and 1957, the government must show that the property
involved in such violations is derived from a "specified unlawful activity" as defined
by § 1956(c) (7).2 Therefore, such a policy should not be necessary, for, in order
206 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b) (Law. Co-op 1990).
20 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(7) (Law. Co-op 1990).
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to effectuate administrative forfeitures, the Federal agency must make a probable
cause showing to the United States Magistrate that the property to be seized has been
derived from a specified unlawful activity, which is definitely a much harder
proposition than showing a violation of §§ 5313(a) or 5324.21
As discussed previously, Section 1957 specifically states that any transaction
necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution is exempt from its purview. This includes both the
defendant and his counsel and also precludes forfeiture of the attorney's fee.2'
However, an interesting question arises when an attorney receives several cashier's
checks over a period of weeks or months in payment of his fee. If the checks were
purchased as a part of a structuring violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, then pursuant to
the apparent violation of § 5324 the attorney's fee could be seized and forfeited
pursuant to § 981 (a)(1)(A). It might not be obvious to the attorney that the checks
given to him for his fee was part of a structuring scheme. In fact, it will probably
not be obvious to the attorney that such a structuring scheme was used, even if he
or she knew all the relevant facts, due to the time period of the acts. 210 A literal
reading of § 981(a)(1)(A) would appear to provide for forfeiture in this situation, for
neither § 5324 nor § 981 contains a provision exempting transactions dealing with
an individuals' sixth Amendment rights.
Another example might be where a defendant launders a substantial amount
of cash, say, in excess of $100,000, by exchanging the cash at various financial
institutions for many cashier's checks, all in amounts less than $10,000. The
defendant is indicted for the transactions. He retains counsel and gives the counsel
two of the checks. Since the defendant is charged with a financial crime, under 31
U.S.C. § 5324, those cashiers checks are forfeitable under § 981. However, suppose
the defendant is charged with a non-structuring violation, say, the carrying of a
concealed weapon. Here the attorney might not be put on notice that his fee was at
risk until it was too late.
In the above examples, where the attorney would not in any way have been
reasonably put on notice that the fee paid him came from part of a structuring scheme,
the provision § 981(a)(2), the "innocent owner defense" should be sufficient to keep
the fee from ultimately bring forfeited.211 In addition, the House Report notes that,
"the fact that the violation occurred without the knowledge of the owner could be
raised as a defense to forfeiture.' '212 In addition, the House Judiciary Committee
bypassed its desire that the amounts under $25,000 be forfeited "sparingly" and with
2- 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(b) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41,
209 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(0(1) (1990).
210 For an indepth discussion of the CTR laws and structuring violations specifically regarding 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324, see Smurfs, Moneylaundering, and the Federal Criminal Law of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA.
L. REv. 287 (1989).
211 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a)(2) (Law. Co-op 1990).
212 H.R. RaP. No. 746, supra note 211, at 20.
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"good cause." 213 The statutory provision of § 981 (a)(2) and the legislative history
provided the attorney with some useful tools to ultimately keep the fee from being
forfeited. However, with the statutory language of § 981 clearly shifting the burden
of proof onto the defendant to establish lack of knowledge, such a procedure could
pose a substantial problem for a defense attorney during the existence of the attorney-
client privilege. It should be interesting to see the posture the Department of Justice
will develop in regard to this issue, and how the courts will treat the same.2 4
Up to now, we have discussed the practical applications of the civil forfeiture
statute in conjunction with violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a) and 5324. We will
now turn our attention to the application of § 981 in conjunction with the money
laundering statutes, §§ 1956 and 1957. The analysis will focus on two examples.
1. First Example
X is a high level narcotics dealer. X has operated as such for approximately
fifteen to twenty years. X has amassed quite a fortune. He now owns many
residential and commercial pieces of real estate with a value of approximately
$2,000,000. He has stock and other investments with financial institutions amount-
ing to close to $1,000,000. X owns various other passive investments. X enjoys a
very nice lifestyle, has several luxury cars of his own in addition to buying several
new cars for his family members. X makes a point to pay for as many things as he
can in cash, so as to make it very hard for the IRS to document his expenditures. X
is so well insulated from his narcotics operations that no Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency with narcotics jurisdiction has been able to successfully
investigate X and indict him on narcotics violations. X has received some "financial
advice" from a CPA and attorneys, whereby he sets up a sham corporation to launder
some of his drug profits so as to give him a' 'legitimate" source of income, sufficient
to cover his annual living expenses.
Subsequently, due to X's unexplained wealth and alleged reputation as a high
level drug dealer, the IRS Criminal Division initiates a Grand Jury investigation of
X. Remember that under § 981, it was not until after November 18, 1988, that the
government was empowered to seize the entire asset when it could demonstrate
based upon probable cause that the asset to be seized was involved in or traceable
to a transaction or attempted transaction occurring after November 18, 1988, in
violation of § § 1956 or 1957.2t5 This transactional requirement of § § 1956 and 1957
in conjunction with the effective date of the provision in § 981(a)(1), allowing the
government to seize assets upon violations of the money laundering statutes poses
2 Id. at 21.
214 See Cassens, "ABA Backs Defense Attorneys" 72 A.B.A.J. Oct. 1986,40. See also Treasury Department
Declines to Adopt Suggested Exemption for Attorney's Fees, 39 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2462 (Sept. 17,
1986).
21s Supra note 173. The effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L.-100 690 was November
18, 1988.
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an interesting issue as to whether the government can: (a) force forfeiture of assets
of X purchased prior to the effective date of § 981; and (b) whether the government
can force forfeiture under § 981, of those assets purchased prior to November 18,
1988, but subsequently liquidated, with the proceeds of the previously acquired asset
being involved in a financial transaction occurring after November 18, 1988.
As to the question posed in (a), the government will not be able to force
forfeiture of X's assets under § 981 which he purchased prior to November 18, 1988,
and which stayed in that same form after the effective date of § 981. However, since
X is a narcotics trafficker and based upon the substantial evidence of X's narcotics
trafficking and the fact that X has had no legitimate source of income for the last
twenty years, the government may be able to forfeit those assets which X acquired
with illegal proceeds prior to November 18, 1988, under 21 U.S.C. § 881.216
Although the IRS does not have jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 881, in all likelihood,
the investigation of X will be conducted through a Grand Jury investigation, and an
agency with jurisdiction of the narcotics statutes, such as the FBI or DEA, will be
asked to participate in the Grand Jury investigation, so as to effectuate the forfeitures
under 21 U.S.C. § 881, with the assistance of the IRS.
As stated previously, the IRS Criminal Division initiates a Grand Jury
investigation of X based upon the above information. Through the course of its
investigation, the IRS is able to recompute X's income for the past five years, using
the net worth method, to show X has substantially understated his income, in
addition to showing he did not have sufficient legitimate income to obtain the wealth
he now has. In addition, during the course of the investigation the IRS has been able
to document substantial evidence of X's drug activity, so much so that the
government will be able to prove that X has not earned a single penny of legitimate
income, other than what his investments from his illegal income have produced. The
government plans to go forward and indict X and several others with tax violations
and violations of § § 1956 and 1957. It also intends to force forfeiture of as many of
X's assets as it can. However, in doing so, the government must be cognizant of the
dates such assets were acquired by X.
As stated in question (a) above, in order to force forfeiture assets purchased
by X prior to November 18, 1988, the government must make and prepare the
necessary forfeiture affidavits for the seizure warrants and effectuate the forfeiture
of those assets pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 for X's assets purchased prior to
November 18, 1988, which retain such form. However, as to those assets which the
government can show were purchased by X in transactions occurring after Novem-
ber 18, 1988, with proceeds derived from a specified unlawful activity, (here
narcotics trafficking) in violation of §§ 1956 or 1957 or traceable thereto, the
government can force forfeiture under § 981.
216 21 U.S.C.S. § 881 (Law. Co-op 1990).
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However, the interesting question is can the government force forfeiture of
any asset of X which he bought with the proceeds of narcotics trafficking prior to§ 981's effective date, but which he later liquidates or sells, conducting another
transaction after November 18, 1988, with the proceeds of the sale of the asset. Can
the government force forfeiture of the funds from the sale if X merely deposits the
proceeds in one of his many bank accounts, the funds deposited representing the
proceeds of an illegal activity which X earned prior to the passage of either § § 1956,
1957, or 981? It can be argued very strongly that such asset should be forfeitable
under § 981 as long as the government can show a probable cause basis that the
transaction in which the property was involved was conducted with proceeds from
a specified unlawful activity and such transaction violated either § 1956 or 1957.
Such forfeiture would be based on the following reasons. First, Congress
specifically incorporated into the provision of § 981 the" relation back doctrine.' '21?
That doctrine states that the right, title, and interest in property illegally obtained
shall vest in the United States upon commission of the illegal act which gives rise
to the forfeiture, i.e. narcotics trafficking and here a transaction involving proceeds
from a specified unlawful activity. Sections 1956, 1957, and 981 were passed in
October 27, 1986, and amended on November 18, 1988. Indeed one can infer that,
by inclusion of the explicit codification of the relation back doctrine into § 981,
Congress intended to reach all assets which were purchased with illegal proceeds in
transactions after the effective date of these statutes, if such transactions had the
defined bad purpose or in which the criminal purchased large ticket luxury items
with his illegally acquired income. 21 1
Sections 1956 and 1957 do not proscribe transactions conducted with the
proceeds of illegal activity earned after the dates of their passage. These statutes
proscribe the conducting of transactions by individuals who know the proceeds
involved in their transaction are derived from a specified unlawful activity. If
Congress intended for §§ 1956 and 1957 to apply only to illegal proceeds earned
after their effective dates, then Congress would have built into the statute an almost
unbeatable defense for the defendant. For, any time one would be indicted under this
statute, all the defendant would merely have to do is say the money involved in the
transaction was earned prior to the effective date of §§ 1956 and 1957, thereby
evading conviction and precluding forfeiture of the proceeds or asset involved in the
transaction. Although Congress did not explicitly debate this issue when promul-
gating these statutes, a reading of the legislative history clearly gives a reader the
impression that Congress specifically did not contemplate §§ 1956, 1957, and 981
to apply to illegal income earned after their effective date. Indeed Congress called
money laundering "the lifeblood of the drug trade and other criminal organiza-
217 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(f) (Law. Co-op 1990). See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(a) (Law. Co-op 1990).
218 Supra, notes I and 152, respectively, the effective dates of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
was October 27, 1986. The effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was November 18, 1988.
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tions. ' ' 219 Time and again in the testimony included in the various committee reports,
examples are used which reveal that it is not a period or date when the illegal income
was earned which is the controlling factor of this legislation, but the type and
occurrence of a transaction of illegal income which allowed the criminal to carry on
his illegal activities and enjoy the fruits of his labor.
Finally, the application of the Ex Post Facto doctrine to these statutes really
relates to the transactions in which the criminal might engage with his illegally
gotten income and not with the production of the illegal income, which is result of
committing the illegal act which is already proscribed by the substantive crimes
outlined in § 1956(c)(7) defining what a specified unlawful activity is. Therefore,
forthe above reasons, the assets of X which are purchased by him priorto November
18, 1988, with the proceeds from a specified unlawful activity, but sold after
November 18, 1988, and those proceeds used in a transaction which would be a
violation of §§ 1956 or 1957, should be forfeitable. However, if the asset purchased
by X prior to November 18, 1988, is never sold by him or used in a violation of
§§ 1956 or 1957, that asset is beyond the reach of § 981 for the purpose of its
forfeiture.
Another interesting aspect of forfeiture under § 981 is the timing of when the
forfeitures should be effected. Usually in facts similar to the above example,
forfeitures of the assets will not be effectuated until the defendant has been indicted
or if there is a possibility that such assets might disappear. In our above example,
let's say the government has reason to believe X may be initiating a plan to hide his
assets from the government. The government may seize the assets of X under either
exigent circumstances or pursuant to the procedures laid our in § 981, during the
course of the criminal investigation. Although the seizures were effectuated during
the criminal investigation, it should not have a disastrous effect on the criminal in-
vestigation, even though much of the evidence obtained in the criminal investigation
will be open to discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon X
contesting the forfeitures in Federal district court. This is because the government
has two factors in its favor. First, § 981(g) allows for a stay of the civil forfeiture
action by the government, upon a showing of good cause, when an indictment or
information is filed alleging a violation of Federal, State, or local law, which is
related to the forfeiture proceeding under § 981. Second, although under the very
liberal discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the "govern-
ments" fies relating to the investigation are open to the person from whom the assets
were seized, such liberal discovery rules also open up discovery for the government
as to almost anything related to the person underinvestigation or the assets forfeited.
This the forfeite (or person under investigation) is almost never willing to do until
the criminal action has run its course, for such discovery will almost always be more
harmful to the individual(s) than it would be to the government.
219 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 4.
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It should be pointed out here, although it should be fairly obvious, that the
person contesting a civil forfeiture action by the government effectuated under § 981
has the burden of proof in the subsequent judicial proceeding, pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This fact also has an impact on the person contesting the
forfeiture, as to whether he will continue the civil action. Again, the contesting party
usually postpones the action until after the disposition of the criminal matter.
2. Second Example
The substitute asset provision of § 982, the criminal forfeiture provision, can
be employed in situations where an individual may have substantial assets and a
good deal of legitimate income, but there is no way to trace the illegal income or
show that certain assets were purchased with the illegal income, although it can be
shown how much illegal income was produced. For example, Doctor X is selling
prescriptions and dispensing certain drugs for cash to his "patients." State and
Federal law require the medical professional to separately and accurately record the
dispensing of such drugs, and forbid the sale of prescriptions and drugs in such a
manner. Doctor X is not accurately recording the number of the drugs he is
dispensing although he is recording each transaction. A medical professional is not
required to record the prescriptions he writes (other than possibly in the patient's file)
as the prescription is recorded at the pharmacy. Through an investigation, the
government is able to determine through the information contained in the above
documents, the amount of money, which is substantial, which Doctor X had made
by obtaining the drug dispensing records and the prescriptions (all the "patients"
went to the same drug store since the pharmacist was given a "kickback" from Doctor
X or for all the prescriptions he filled for Doctor X's "patients."
The government in this situation may bring charges for narcotics violation
under 21 U.S.C. § 843, money laundering violations under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and
(ii) and tax violations -- after all, Doctor X did not go to all this trouble just to report
all this income on his tax return. Note that the narcotics violations under 21 U.S.C.
§ 843 would be the specified unlawful activity for the money laundering violations.
In proving the tax violations under 26 U.S.C. § § 7201 or 7206, the predicate offense
under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) would be proven. Note, however, that the money Doctor
X derived from this practice of drug distribution cannot be directly traced, since the
transactions were all in cash and Doctor X was smart enough not to leave a money
trail by depositing such proceeds in a bank. Although the government can show
almost to the penny how much Doctor X earned from the sale of drugs and
prescriptions, Doctor X also earned a great deal of legitimate income from his
legitimate treatment of patients. This precludes the government from seizing Doctor
X's substantial assets either under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 or 981.
However, the government can, along with the tax, narcotics, and money
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laundering charges, force forfeiture of the money it can show Doctor X earned from
his illegal practices. Upon conviction of the money laundering counts under § 1956,
it would be mandatory, pursuant to § 982, that the court order Doctor X to turn over
that amount of money which the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt he
earned from the illegal drug practices. It should be noted that, in regard to this fact
situation and those situations similar to it, the civil forfeiture provision of § 981,
although it carries a much less stringent burden of proof (that of probable cause)
could not be utilized in this situation because there was insufficient nexus to link the
proceeds of the illegal activity to the identifiable assets. It should be apparent,
however, that both statutes provide flexible tools to hinder the criminal from
enjoying the fruits of his labor.
Although the above examples and, indeed, the majority of examples in this
analysis have dealt with the specified unlawful activity being that of narcotics
violations, such was the choice for ease of presentation of the subject matter. It
should be strongly noted, however, that §§ 1956, 1957, 981, and 982 deal with any
of the specified unlawful activities and the proceeds derived therefrom as defined by
§ 1956(c)(7), which range from interstate murder for hire, gambling, prostitution,
securities fraud, bank fraud, and embezzlement, to almost anything in between.
However, a small caveat may be proper in regard to the forfeiture of assets in some
of these specified unlawful activities. For example, in bank fraud and securities
fraud, the assets which are eventually seized from those convicted under such
statutes, or such activities are used as the specified unlawful activity for a §§ 1956
or 1957 charge, are usually bank depositors' or investors' money. Therefore, care
should be taken by the government, for there may be competing interests, such as
private rights of action for which the payment may be made from those very assets
which are targeted for forfeiture. However, § 981(e) grants the Attorney General,
Secretary of the Treasury, or Postal Service authority:
To transfer such forfeited property or such terms and conditions as he
may determine to any another Federal agency..to the affected financial
institution in receivership or liquidation, or any 'Federal financial
institution regulatory agency: (A) reimburse the agency for pay-
ments to claimants or creditors of the institution; and (B) to reim-
burse the insurance fund of the agency for losses suffered by the fund
as a result of the receivership or liquidation...." 220
One final note must be briefly stated in regard to forfeited property. The
question arises as to the taxable status of forfeited. The recent court cases have held
that money and other property earned from illegal activities constitute taxable
income, despite being forfeited to the government. The cases also hold that no
deduction is allowed to offset this seeming double benefit to the government. 221
-0 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(e)(1)-(5) (Law. Co-op 1990).
" Wood v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. La. 1988), Gambina b. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 826 (1988),
Pring v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-340 (July 17, 1989).
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Therefore, in conclusion to this forfeiture analysis, not only do §§ 1956 and
1957 provide for substantial criminal penalties (the greater of $500,000 and
$250,000 respectively, or twice the value of the property) and substantial civil
penalties for § 1956 (which, as emphatically stated by Congress, is to be imposed
in addition to the criminal penalty), they provide substantial jail time of twenty years
and ten years, respectively, for §§ 1956 and 1957. In addition, there are the
forfeitures provisions to go along with these severe financial and incarceration
penalties. On top of all this, that which is taken is taxable to the defendant. The
prospects for one who runs afoul of these statutes is not very bright.
CONCLUSION
Money laundering has been called the "lifeblood" of criminals and criminal
organizations. Recognizing this fact, Congress passed §§ 1956 and 1957, along with
their companion forfeiture statutes, §§ 981 and 982, with the intent to make the
criminal's ill gotten gains worthless. 222
Sections 1956 and 1957 effectively criminalize almost any transaction
conducted with the proceeds of specified unlawful activities. The statutes apply to
anyone who participates in such transactions. The only real limitation in application
of these statutes is that of the government must show: (1) the person knew the
proceeds involved in the transaction were from some illegal source; and (2) the
proceeds did, in fact, come from a specified unlawful activity. Based upon recent
court cases such as Blackman, evidence required to prove element (2) is not over-
whelming.
It appears that Congress made this law one to which the criminal community
should stand up and pay attention, by providing that any violation of these statutes
carries with it a maximum of twenty years for § 1956 and ten years for § 1957. In
addition to the substantial incarceration periods, Congress included substantial civil
and criminal penalties, which it made very clear are both to be assessed. On top of
all this, those assets traceable to or used in violation of §§ 1956 and 1957 are
forfeitable, and such items are still taxable in light of forfeiture.
Although not a panacea, these statutes should provide the government with a
formidable tool in fighting the narcotics trade and other illegal activities. Prior to
the passage of these statutes, criminals could be prosecuted for: (a) violations of the
substantive criminal statute; and (b) failure to report the ill gotten income. Now, with
these new money laundering statutes, the criminal and those who assist him can be
prosecuted for merely handling and using their illegal proceeds. In addition, the
government can take virtually any assets the criminal has acquired with his ill gotten
gains.
2" S. REP. No. 433, supra note 6, at 4.
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MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTES
The statutes should have an impact in the way the government conducts its
criminal investigations. Criminals, in operating their trade and organizations, have
become very good at insulating themselves from the actual illegal activity. Accord-
ingly, it is often difficult to bring substantive charges against these individuals for
their proscribed activities. This is where these new money laundering statutes
should have their greatest impact, especially in situations where the criminal is well
insulated and his only source of income is from the illegal activity. Likewise, it
should also be useful to the IRS' Criminal Division in its tax investigations which
involve the laundering or production of illegal income.
The forfeiture provisions of § 981 may especially by valuable to the govern-
ment in conducting its criminal investigations. First, it is very conceivable that
through the civil forfeitures, the government could take a great deal of the criminal's
assets with or without indicting or convicting him. The more forfeitures, the less
assets the criminal has to continue his illegal activity. Second, much of these
forfeited assets will go directly to Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies, to be used in their fight against crimes. Third, the effectiveness of such
forfeiture and substantive statutes may prompt States to legislate similar statutes so
as to allow the State and local law enforcement agencies to take the assets of these
who violate their statutes. This would also alleviate the time and burden on Federal
law enforcement agencies adopting the seizures to effectuate the forfeiture for State
and local agencies, since such statutes are not on the books of most states.
This new legislation is definitely a step in the right direction by Congress.
However, Congress, the Treasury, and the IRS should realize that combating
complex organized crime and its sophisticated money laundering schemes, espe-
cially in relation to the drug problem in this country, is such an enormous problem
at this point that a concerted effort must be ongoing, and provisions such as these
must be the norm and not the exception. The government must allocate a greater
amount of resources and personnel in this problem, as it still takes considerable
resources to uncover and investigate such money laundering schemes and their
underlying criminal activity. These statutes, however, are a start, and represent a
needed tool in the government's arsenal to put a dent in the multi-billion dollar
economy of the narcotics trade and other lucrative criminal enterprises.
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